Turkey: Sly as a Fox? Explaining the successive development of Turkey’s multilateral cooperation efforts by Özgen, Murat
Lund University  STVM23 
Department of Political Science  Tutor: Maria Strömvik 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey: Sly as a Fox? 
Explaining the successive development of Turkey‘s 
multilateral cooperation efforts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
By  
Murat Özgen 
 
  
Abstract 
Since the European Union membership application in 1987, twenty-six years have 
passed and the status of Turkey has only progressed from a ―potential candidate‖ 
to an ―official candidate‖. At the same time, a successive expansion is traceable in 
Turkey‘s efforts for multilateral cooperation with other parts of the world. While 
being seemingly random at the first sight, it is possible to observe distinct and 
specific periods where these efforts were escalated. The explanation for this 
phenomenon rests upon the presented harmony between these specific periods and 
the contributable insights given by the realist tradition. The applied congruence 
method shows that the use of ―balance of threat‖ arguments does not demonstrate 
a great deal of correlation with times of strained relations between the 
USSR/Russia and Turkey. On the contrary, the deliberated ―balance of influence‖ 
arguments present an interesting parallel with these efforts throughout the periods 
of significant deadlocks in Turkey-EU relations.   
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1 Introduction 
The hope of the Turkish Republic to be accepted by their fellow Europeans stems 
from as far back as the foundations of the country itself. The establishment of the 
new Turkish government in 1923, after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire set its 
identity and norms, through modernization principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
with a strong belief of belongingness to ―Europe‖ or the ―Western Civilizations‖. 
Inevitably, these foundations drive the motivations of Turkish foreign policy to 
orbit around the idea of being accepted as European.
 1
 This desire was recognized 
by the European Economic Community (EEC) in the Ankara Agreement of 1963 
setting the foundations of the association of both sides. At the ceremony, the 
statement of the then President of the European Commission (Commission), 
Waller Hallstein emphasized that ―Turkey is a part of Europe‖2 as well as Article 
28 of the agreement itself envisaging the possibility of full accession.
3
 The 
hopeful picture of the initial formalization of those relations led Turkey to follow 
and accept European standards in the belief of achieving the envisaged 
membership. Ultimately, on April 14, 1987 the Turkish Government submitted an 
application for full membership to the European Community (EC).
4
  
After the historical leap of faith to finalize this wish, twenty-six years have 
passed and the status of this desire has only progressed from a potential candidate 
to an official candidate. The intensification of cooperation between the sides 
slowly pursued; the application‘s recognition by 1990, its Customs Union (CU) by 
1996, official candidate status by 1999 and opening up of the negotiations by 
2004. Meanwhile, the EEC of ―the Six‖ countries that Turkey had applied to join 
evolved successively into a European Union (EU) of twenty-eight countries as of 
2013. Sixteen of those additional members came after the Turkish application of 
1987. As the sphere of cooperation of the EU expanded, a similar tendency in the 
Turkish cooperation efforts became observable. As well as successively 
expanding bilateral cooperation with countries in other regions through various 
mechanisms such as Free Trade Agreements
5
 or Bilateral Agreements for 
Cooperation on Culture,
6
 Turkey also expanded its cooperation
7
 efforts in the 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
1 Müftüler-Baç 2000,  p. 498-499. 
2 The Economist 2010. 
3 Agreement Establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey 1963, Art. 
28. 
4 Commission of the European Communities 1989, Art. 1.  
5 Ministry of Economy 2012a. Since 1996, a total of 19 FTA agreements have been concluded with countries 
outside EU after the establishment of the Customs Union. 
6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012a. To give an idea, a quick look will show that out of the total 77 agreements 
concluded since the establishment of 1923, more than half (43) have been concluded after 1987.  
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collective multilateral sense of the word. As such, collaboration of political, 
economic, cultural and military means was realized outside the realm of the EU.
8
 
Why is it that Turkey, who dedicated twenty-six years of multilateral 
cooperation efforts for its membership pledge with the Europeans, successively 
expands its reach with other regions? Keeping in mind the establishing 
mechanisms for international cooperation takes substantial amount of time, effort 
and money even for bilateral means, a country who actively seeks to create or join 
multilateral cooperation mechanisms continuously in other regions is intriguing. 
In the sense that, since its application to an already existing and significant 
multilateral cooperation unit like the European Union already holds up a 
significant portion of space in its foreign policy objectives. The question becomes 
more fascinating when one gives attention to the circumstances that encircle this 
occurrence. It is an established fact that up until the 1990‘s, Turkish foreign 
policy regarded itself as cautious and unquestionably oriented to the West.
9
 It is 
also a fact that the Turkish position in the Cold War era international system stood 
aside with Europe and the United States as Turkey actively sought, contributed 
and secured memberships in organizations like the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) and the Council of Europe. The Turks were for a very long time reluctant 
to cooperate with the regions that were under the Soviet umbrella. This was also 
the case in the regions of the Southern Islamic nations where religious influence 
of Islam is vast on state government which contradicts the secularist Western 
principles of Turkey‘s foundations.10 In other words, we are witnessing a 
traditionally cautious country, on entering multilateral cooperation with the other 
sides of the world, to successively cooperate with the very same regions that it 
was cautious to since its official intention to increase and deepen cooperation with 
the EU. 
The study, motivated by these observations, thus aims to provide explanations 
for the successive establishments of multilateral cooperation mechanisms by 
Turkey outside the EU after the application of the membership pledge. More 
specifically, the study will examine two different theoretical suggestions to 
elucidate the successive expansion of the Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts, 
in order to present the most important driving-forces in process. 
For necessity, it is important to clarify at the very beginning what the study 
does not intend to do. While focusing on the successive associations of Turkey‘s 
multilateral cooperation mechanisms, success of these establishments or their 
possible effects after Turkey joins or creates a mechanism, is not a matter of 
analysis in this research. To pursue such a study, different theoretical and 
methodological approaches are needed and some examples can already be found 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
7 From this point onwards the word ―efforts for multilateral cooperation‖ will be used interchangeably with 
―efforts‖ or ―cooperative efforts‖.  
8 The specifics of these cooperation efforts will be further discussed in the following chapter. 
9  Akgün 2009, p. 2; Cagaptay 2013, p. 803. 
10 Oran 2010a, p. 7. 
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on the individual level.
11
 Another issue which is also not in focus here is the 
question of why the Turkish candidacy could not move forward. The question of 
why the EU still does not accept to finalize the cooperation between the sides has 
already been discussed extensively in academia. Amongst others, the general 
conclusions from these studies point at concepts such as incompatible demands, 
lack of political will and importance of identity differences. There are many 
reasons why the cooperation process took so long to be found. On the other hand, 
the question of why Turkey is successively giving effort on cooperating with other 
regions and deepening relations has no such obvious answers that are 
unequivocal. Even the question, ―is there an identifiable shift in the Turkish 
cooperation focus?‖ itself already started to take a lot of attention in the last few 
years,
12
 therefore identification of these movements trigger more interest. Finally, 
the study does not aim to capture all the complexities of Turkish foreign policy, 
nor giving detailed descriptions of the real life processes. Rather, the aim is to 
provide a detailed and systematic explanation over time for the overall 
multilateral cooperation efforts of Turkey.  
1.1 Why study Turkish Multilateral Cooperation in 
relation with the EU? 
In the international relations discipline, questions of power and influence sit at the 
center stage in relation to states, actors or ideational flows. These questions 
increasingly take attention especially when a state or a group of states seek efforts 
on cooperation and collaboration in a collective manner. Inevitably, the questions 
take concern on the participating states as well as ―to the functioning of (and 
effects on) the international system.‖13  
To give an example, substantial amount of studies that focus on Turkish 
foreign policy in the last decade emphasized the regional power, soft power or 
regional economic power dimensions of Turkey while discussing the Turkish 
efforts to cooperate with other regions
14
. Indeed, the emphasis on power when 
discussing the active Turkish foreign policy stands vital to the motivations of such 
engagements, where they are referred to be under the objective of consolidating 
power and prestige.
15
 To be fair, irrespective of how much of these engagements 
are perceived as power or how much they actually have an effect, it is an 
undeniable fact that how Turkey perceives power rotates around the idea of 
cooperation. Therefore, it is essential to include this aspect when analyzing the 
external relations of Turkey. Furthermore, while analyzing Turkish external 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
11 Dikkaya & Orhan 2004; Stribis 2005. 
12 Bal 2011; Babacan 2011; Öniş 2011; Aydin 2013; Yuvaci & Kaplan 2013; Katcher 2010. 
13 Strömvik 2005, p. 5 
14 Korkut & Civelekoğlu 2012-2013; Cagaptay 2013; Theophylactou 2012; Atinay 2008. 
15 Özcan & Usul 2011, p. 161. 
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relations, it is impossible to not take the EU into consideration. Due to the 
extensive space the EU candidacy covers in the Turkish cooperation objectives, 
the effect of the EU in the general framework has also been reiterated in the 
influential book ―Strategic Depth‖ by the current Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Professor Ahmet Davutoğlu. The book sets out Turkish cooperation efforts by an 
analogy of the ―bow and arrow‖ where the external relations of Turkey should 
resemble a ―bow‖ that extends its coverage to Asia as far as possible in order to be 
able shoot the ―arrow‖ in to Europe. The analogy pictures the objectives of the 
successive cooperation efforts in other regions, as an essential tool to increase the 
geopolitical importance of Turkey in order to be an in dispensable ally by the 
West.
16
 
The importance of Turkey in the structure of the international system has also 
received attention in the last decade. Turkish power in the international system 
has debatably been discussed if it is starting to be among the rising powers like 
the BRICS bloc or near BRIC countries or even if it can be described as an 
unfitting candidate to any of the rising power classifications
17
. The lists of 
adjectives continue with other classifications such as mid-sized power or Strategic 
Medium Power (SMP).
18
 All of these studies may suggest and analyze Turkish 
power in different ways or come up with different conclusions. However, their 
lowest common denominator is that; Turkey has an impact in the regional 
developments and at least marginal influence in the international system mainly 
considering amongst other things, its geostrategic position.
19
 Therefore, a 
potential rise coupled with a potential orient shift in the trajectory of the Turkish 
power, will have potential effects in the balances of the system let alone the 
region. In relation, for those who would rather study the normative power and 
values in the global system, Turkey is gaining a lot of attention in terms of its 
responsibility as being a role model
20
 for the Islamic nations of the Middle East 
and North Africa. It is possible to identify this discourse by the Western countries 
as well as the Turkish leaders who are presenting Turkey as a successful unique 
example, which managed to merge democracy with a predominant Muslim 
population who promotes humanitarian values.
21
 The self-assumed responsibility 
to stand as a norm pursuer usually gets identified with the EU.
22
 However, 
considering the common cultural values with the Muslim countries and the long-
lasting relations with the West; there exists a significant possibility for Turkey to 
make a difference in a field where the EU holds substantial interest.  
Inevitably, to cover all of the aspects mentioned above a bigger study is 
needed. Nevertheless, they should be seen as mere motivations and a general 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
16 Davutoğlu 2001, p. 562. 
17 For related arguments, see Cagaptay 2013; Öniş & Kutlay 2013;  Oğuzlu 2013. 
18 Balcer 2013; Oran 2010a, p. 9 
19 Oran 2010a, p. 9 
20 For recent contributions, see Göksel 2012; Rubin 2012; Kubicek 2013; Perekli 2012; Al-Azm 2011; Younis 
2011. 
21 Todays Zaman 2011; Küçükkoşum 2011.  
22 Dal 2013, p. 710 
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framework that this study hopes to contribute for explaining why multilateral 
cooperation efforts of Turkey are successively expanding in relation to the EU. 
These explanations can be regarded as important constituents of the general 
structure of how we can interpret the developing image of Turkey as well as its 
relations in the international scene. Truth be told, even though an increasing 
interest exists, there have only been few attempts to conceptualize and theorize 
the main systematic and regional factors that are at play in the particular 
conditions of Turkey.
23
 Thus, this study aims to contribute to the empirical 
occurrence of the successive Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts as well as to 
the theoretical debate over causes that push for cooperation mechanisms among 
states by showing the Turkish case.  
1.2 Existing studies on the effects of Turkish-EU 
relations on Turkish multilateral cooperation behavior 
While analyzing the Turkish cooperation efforts with other regions, some 
arguments seem to be focusing on how the inflow and outflow of the Turkish 
economic relations started to shift and diversify to other regions due to the 
reluctance of the EU.
24
 Some interpretations even claim that increasing and 
diversifying cooperation engagements of Turkey weaken (or are as a result of) the 
complicated relations with the EU.
25
 In addition, substantial amount of scholars 
tried to identify the possibility of interpreting these engagements in other regions 
as an ―axis shift‖26 in the foreign policy orientation of Turkey. The arguments 
from these types of studies would generally help to illustrate whether the current 
cooperation efforts could count as an indication of Turkey moving further away 
from the EU and the West. In essence, these arguments can be mostly regarded as 
evaluative researches which tend to describe the policy efficiencies and their 
implications for the later periods. However, it is also necessary to keep in mind 
that ―questions of policy efficiency are not necessarily the same as questions about 
the existence or not of some policy activities‖27 which this study aims to answer. 
To be clear, the existing literature on Turkish foreign policy that focus on the EU, 
presents the general tendency to seek for wide ranging research outcomes in the 
hope of explaining impacts of various factors at different levels.
28
 Judging from 
the research, it is also possible to say that there are no set categorizations for 
analyzing the cooperation efforts in relation to the EU and the use of descriptive 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
23 Oğuzlu & Dal 2013, p. 618 
24 For recent contributions on similar arguments, see Esfahani & Gürakar 2013; Kirişçi 2012; Babacan 2011. 
25 For such claims, see 'Turkey: EU Accession Increasingly Doubtful'  2011 , p. 16; 'Turkey Turns East Once 
focused on the EU, shifting focus to Asia and Middle East' 2012, p. 14 
26 Bal 2011; Babacan 2011; Öniş 2011;  Aydin 2013; Yuvaci & Kaplan 2013; Katcher 2010.  
27 Strömvik 2005, p. 9 
28 Yazgan 2012, p. 179-180 
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and empirical analyses are more common approaches. An analyst, in an 
interesting survey of International Relations studies concerning Turkish foreign 
policy also pointed out that the use of theory and theoretical outcomes have not 
been given high priority.
29
 While the literature tends to develop the empirical 
occurrence of Turkish cooperation behavior, systematic testable theoretical 
explanations tend to be unelevated. Thereby, through the use of various 
theoretical insights, this study aims to contribute and distinguish when and why 
we should expect successive Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts at certain 
times. 
Other similarities are evident in timeframe and scope of research that is 
focused on. Nearly all of the latest studies, which analyze Turkish cooperation 
engagements in other regions, tend to agree from the beginning that this type of 
behavior overlaps or increases with the time period spanning from 2002. In 
addition, the research scope is usually specified to bilateral relations or single 
regional engagements. Certainly, the rising attention on the axis shift arguments 
owes its base to the ―new‖ dynamic foreign policy of the Justice and Development 
Party (JDP) who came to power in Turkey. Nevertheless, though some 
interpretations of the previous multilateral cooperation engagements on specific 
case levels exist,
30
 the literature on changing cooperation behavior lacks 
systematic comparisons or total analyses that include prior decades. The general 
highlighted linkages with the EU, seems to be parallel to the foreign policy 
objectives set by the ―bow and arrow‖ analogy, in terms of the necessity that 
cooperation with other regions presents Turkey to be an indispensable ally to the 
West. Therefore the behavior is interpreted as something of a means to the end. In 
relation, other interpretations are not uncommon, as Marc Pierini, a former French 
ambassador and Director of European Commission‘s Delegation to Turkey states 
in an article; ―in the eyes of Turkey‘s Western partners, Ankara frequently 
fluctuates on international issues, displays a distinct lack of consistency in dealing 
with its friends and allies, and occasionally gives off the scent of an imperial 
attitude… [] making it difficult—and at times perplexing—to make sense of 
Ankara‘s foreign policy aims‖31. Needless to say, this study does not follow these 
types of claims thus, aims to look from a different angle to primarily seek for 
other factors for why the ―bow‖ is expanding and if there are other factors at play. 
Maybe, when observed from an alternative wholesome stand point, there may be 
an identifiable ―consistency‖ in the ―inconsistent‖ behavior after all? 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
29 Yazgan 2012, p. 183; Aydin & Yazgan 2013. 
30 See for an early claim on Black Sea Economic Cooperation as a regional challenge to European integration by 
Turkey, Gençkaya 1993. 
31 Pierini 2013. 
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1.3 Thesis Structure 
Keeping in mind the according motivations, this study will continue 
progressively. The following section will first outline the research design while 
explaining the methodology and theoretical base of the study. From the realist 
tradition two different hypotheses are obtained for explaining when an attempted 
multilateral cooperation effort can be predicted. The third section will present all 
attempts of the multilateral cooperation efforts outside the EU by analyzing the 
dates of all International Organizations which Turkey has applied to or created 
since 1987. The dates of the first decision to create or join an organization and the 
dates of establishment or memberships will be pinpointed on a timeline. If 
possible to observe, intensity will also be highlighted. The two latter chapters will 
be based on this presented data, specifically analyzing and testing the two 
suggested hypothesizes. In chapter four, accordingly to the presented balance of 
threat hypothesis, the proposition of an important external force to cause such 
behavior will be analyzed. However, the proposition from the balance of threat 
thesis will be argued to show insufficient harmony with the data. Therefore, 
another hypothesis will be highlighted in chapter five. It will be shown that the 
proposed balance of influence hypothesis is very significant to show congruence, 
leading from the disputes between the EU and Turkey. Finally, the last chapter 
will summarize the findings and show that there is sufficient proof for believing 
the existence of a consistent behavior from an appearing ―inconsistent‖ 
relationship. 
  
  8 
2 Catching the ―Fox‖ 
At first glance, it can be deceptive to interpret the foreign policy behaviour of 
Turkey in terms of inconsistency or randomness. As such, the similarity with a 
‖cunning fox‖ is perhaps the most metaphoric way to describe the details of this 
decion making. To begin with, while analyzing Turkey‘s successive expansion of 
multilateral cooperation efforts, there is also an inherent assumption within the 
statement: that there actually is an existent successive development. In relation, 
this also presupposes a comparable reality as in there may not be an existent 
successive effort for cooperation before. The assumption however is still debated 
and far from being determined. Nevertheless, the increasing debate among the 
analysts, at least gives us hints on how to handle this discussion. As mentioned 
above, the axis-shift arguments seem to appeal more after the introduction of the 
JDP government in to the Turkish politics. For some, criticizing Turkish foreign 
policy during the JDP leadership for turning away from the West is a common 
way to label this behavior.
32
 These types of criticism to a certain degree, blame 
these attempts for their hidden agendas to ―de-westernize‖ or ―Middle-Easternize‖ 
Turkey.
33
 Others, agree that there is some type of transformation, not in the aim of 
such criticized labels but instead to create ―an autonomous, self-regulating, and 
self-confident foreign policy agenda and normalize the previous crisis-driven 
foreign policymaking of Turkey.‖34 Thereby, stating that pre-JDP Turkish foreign 
policy under the constant Western-oriented conditions comes as standard. 
Accordingly, an initial interpretation of these discussions under these terms can 
tell us that we should rather focus on post-2002 developments.  
However, this study aims to picture changes of the multilateral cooperation 
efforts consistently over time under a systemic level of analysis. That means the 
―actor‘s characteristics are given by assumption rather than treated as variables; 
changes in outcomes are explained not on the basis of variations in these 
characteristics, but on the basis of changes in the attributes of the system itself.‖35 
Measurement of multilateral cooperation efforts in other regions, regardless if you 
are criticizing or not, through a time period further back from the 2002 yardstick 
with a systemic focus, can shed significant light on even the arguments of today‘s 
debates if there exists a trend of effort away from certain past tendencies.  
Therefore, the presented paper will enable us to show first, how the successive 
multilateral cooperation efforts took place over time spanning from the 
application for membership until today, secondly to identify the most noteworthy 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
32 Cagaptay 2009; Pipes 2007. 
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34 Ibid, p. 206 
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explanation in terms of why this possible trend takes place. This paper‘s inherited 
way of reasoning with the congruence method aims to describe the explanatory 
power of theories and scientific data. The general approach is to find and identify 
an indicator of when these efforts take place or intensify, to ask the question of 
what types of occurrences or events should have predated these developments. In 
order to claim that congruence exists between the theoretical explanations and the 
empirical outcome, these periods will be contrasted with hypotheses extracted 
from the theoretical explanations. This is under the aim of successfully 
distinguishing occurrences which is in correlation preceding the efforts for 
multilateral cooperation.  
This way of engaging the study also offers considerable flexibility and 
adaptability. It also enables the possibility to contribute with theory development 
by showing that ―the theory employed in the congruence method may be well-
established and highly regarded, or it may be formulated or postulated by the 
investigator for the first time on the basis of a hunch that it may turn out to be 
important.‖36 In essence, this way of analyzing the cooperation efforts will give us 
an overall image and idea as opposed to studies that focus on single cases or 
certain periods. The following sections of this chapter will draw the 
methodological and theoretical aspects of the paper. 
2.1 How to describe successive effort for multilateral 
cooperation? 
2.1.1 Conceptualizing the effort for multilateral cooperation 
To analyze change in cooperation patterns, the general academic approach is to 
conceptualize in terms of decisive thresholds, where a history-making event, a 
revolutionary decision or an institutional change may be regarded as pivotal 
points. Justifiably, this way of interpreting or reflecting change in cooperation 
would mean a step by step process, gradually continuing at specific points.
37
 
Indeed, analyzing change in the Turkish cooperation patterns for example with the 
EU generally reflects along specific developments in the relations such as 
changing statuses (like declaration of candidacy and potential candidacy before 
that) or treaty changes (such as an establishment of a Customs Union between the 
sides).
38
 The same type of focus could easily be observed while looking at the 
Turkish-US cooperation patterns where most reflections generally touch upon the 
NATO agreement at some point. Thus, for the sake of simplifying these two 
examples, we can say that while the EU example focuses on a policy development 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
36 George & Bennet 2005,  p. 182 
37 Strömvik 2005, p. 22 
38 For an example, see Yazici 2012. 
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resting upon an economic paradigm, the U.S example rests upon a development 
on military cooperation. Inductively thinking, focusing on some kind of gradual 
development in different fields of policy coordination should not be too far-
fetched while defining successive effort for multilateral cooperation. Charles E. 
Lindblom has touched upon this way of defining cooperation as a required aspect 
where actions that do not stand in pre-existent harmony within different fields of 
policy must be brought in to conformity through a negotiation process.
39
 Building 
upon Lindblom, this study will reformulate Robert Keohane‘s explanation on 
cooperation to occur when: 
actors adjust their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of 
others, through a process of policy coordination. To summarize more 
formally, intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies 
actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as 
facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a 
process of policy coordination.
40
  
Although, this definition then can be regarded as a solid starting point for 
defining cooperation, it does not necessarily help us to identify the prospects of 
effort for cooperation. This is derived from the belief that an effort for cooperation 
functionally does not mean the same thing as cooperation itself. A state may 
propose to cooperate with another actor, however, the effort is existent 
notwithstanding the success or failure or even the efficiency of the later 
developments. It is a rather neglected detail within the literature on analyzing 
cooperation. A modified definition is needed to put it into context. In order to 
narrow the focus, this study will apprehend the effort for cooperation as:  
an observable intention by the actors to adjust their behavior to the 
actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination. To summarize, an effort for intergovernmental 
cooperation takes place when the desired policies actually followed by 
one government are regarded as facilitating realization of their own 
objectives, as an intended result of the process of policy coordination. 
As mentioned, not all the cooperation efforts fall within this conception. 
Turkey‘s foreign policy conducts multiple engagements with other actors through 
mechanisms such as bilateral agreements, development aid and etcetera which fall 
out of the scope of this study. There are no pre-defined boundaries for an effort of 
cooperation to be in this definition. Thus, this paper rather focuses upon 
observable efforts for multilateral cooperation. These engagements can be 
considered in different fields of policy cooperation namely in political, cultural, 
economic and military paradigms where an effort for strengthening cooperation is 
identifiable. 
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2.1.2 Operationalizing the effort for multilateral cooperation 
Although narrowing down the scope is helpful under these circumstances, a task 
for analyzing systematic successive development still tends to be tricky. As it 
would be with any other state, the absence of some kind of comprehensive 
documentation or record of this sort in Turkish foreign policy, requires a 
researcher to seek for undertaking other alternatives. To show a feasible and 
objective image on the efforts for multilateral cooperation, creative thinking 
would give hints on how to handle this type of dead-lock. At this point, a 
―conscious thinker‖ should realize the limitations of the task but ―still manage to 
say a great deal simply by saying hot and cold, warmer and cooler.‖41 Thereby, a 
logical possible way to apprehend would be by finding an indicator that shows the 
efforts for multilateral cooperation in Turkish foreign policy.  
Keohane argues that, a possible way to analyze cooperation is to ―focus on 
particular actions as the unit of analysis.‖42 Such an atomistic perception has 
attractive features however; this is argued to be not preferable as ―instances of 
cooperation and discord could all too easily be isolated from the context of beliefs 
and behavior within which they are embedded.‖43 Implying that, future 
expectations on ―patterns of interaction‖ or assumptions about economic 
arrangements along with political activities should be taken into consideration. 
The argument suggests that an analysis of cooperation should be ―within the 
context of international institutions, broadly defined as in terms of practices and 
expectations… [these] act[s] of cooperation or discord affects the beliefs, rules 
and practices that form the context for future actions.‖44 Building upon, if one 
would like to attempt analyzing patterns on the efforts for multilateral cooperation 
instead of the cooperation itself then, digging into international institutions can be 
a justifiable indication. Assuming that international institutions are significant 
aspects of cooperation and they play a significant role in the understanding of the 
concept, surely a way to study efforts for multilateral cooperation could be based 
upon looking into the attempts of establishing or applying these mechanisms. 
While being solicitous upon the fact that the focus stands outside of the later 
developments of these mechanisms, zooming in on the particular actions (in this 
case the Turkish application or creation of an international institution) as the unit 
of analysis could prove to be valuable. 
Before we continue a short deviation has to be made on defining these 
international institutions to smooth the understanding of the operationalization in 
the study. The introduction of the concept was by John Ruggie who defined it as 
―a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies 
and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states.‖45 
Furthermore, an expanded, plural and collective definition was dubbed by Stephen 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
41 Sartori 1970, p. 1033 
42 Keohane 1984, p. 56 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 as cited in Keohane 1984, p. 57 
  12 
Krasner who emphasized the decision-making procedures of these sets of 
converged expectations as ―prevailing practices for making and implementing 
collective choice.‖46 This kind of a general definition is a useful starting-point 
however still needs to be narrowed down for further operationalization. To make 
it possible, the 1978 Yearbook of International Organizations presents a highly 
relevant reproduced article by A. Judge which gives a comprehensive list and 
classification categories for the concept. This study praises that the given 
categorizations follow a rational qualitative approach which facilitates ―an 
appreciation of the variety of bodies which could be incorporated into any such 
scheme.‖47 The general approach to distinguish which international organizations 
to look at is first through highlighting the three main types identified in the study; 
inter-governmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations 
and multinational enterprises. Because this study focuses on the official 
cooperation efforts, only the organizations that have cooperation on state level 
will be selected, thus, inter-governmental organizations are chosen. To add on this 
initial condition, this study aims to explain Turkish multilateral cooperation 
efforts with other states and regions except the EU after the application of the 
membership pledge. Therefore, another natural selection criterion would be on 
including only the international organizations that have their origin outside from 
the EU since 1987. Next in order is highlighting the types of these organizations. 
Judge identifies four different types of organizations namely; conventional, 
special, minimal information and other.
48
 In table 1 the detail of these types are 
presented for easier understanding.  
 
Table 149 
Conventional Special Minimal Other 
1) Federations of 
international 
organizations 
2) Universal membership 
Organizations 
3) Intercontinental 
membership 
Organizations 
4) Regionally defined 
membership organizations 
1) Inactive or dissolved 
international 
organizations 
2) Multinational 
enterprises 
3) National organizations 
4) Religious orders, 
fraternities and secular 
institutes 
5) International meeting 
series 
1) Recently reported 
bodies -- not yet 
confirmed 
2) Subsidiary and internal 
bodies of other internal 
bodies 
3) Currently inactive non-
conventional or 
unconfirmed bodies 
1) Organizations 
emanating from places, 
persons, proprietary 
products or other bodies 
2) Organizations having a 
special form, including 
foundations and funds 
3) Internationally-oriented 
national organizations 
 
For the purpose of this study, organizations that would match with the 
category of the conventional international organizations constitute the most 
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significant group. This is emanating from the motivation that the organizations 
which would belong to that category should construct at least an ideal minimum 
picture as an indicator for the Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts.  
In order to pursue the selection, a reliable and complete list is needed, 
demonstrating Turkey‘s engagements in international organizations. Luckily, this 
was a straightforward task. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents such 
a list of the names of the engaged international organizations in its official 
website.
50
 According to the set criteria, the most relevant candidates will be 
pinpointed on a time span from 1987 to 2013. The establishment dates as well as 
the initial introductions to negotiation tables will be considered. Moreover, if 
there is an existent possibility to claim frequency within a specific period, the 
study will also be able to take notice. An ability to observe these different periods 
where an abundance of efforts are identifiable, makes it possible to scrutinize on 
the explanation of these occurances. The descriptions of the sub categories and the 
cross-check results will be presented in chapter three. To sum up, after 
discovering all the needed international organizations for the research, the study 
will be able to continue searching for congruence between the empirical data and 
the theoretical explanations. 
2.1.3 What is missing? 
Other than the deliberate choice of excluding efforts for various types of 
cooperation, the study faces an inherent limitation. While drawing an image of the 
efforts for multilateral cooperation over time with such a comprehensive list, the 
biggest problem stands over distinguishing some kind of hierarchy between these 
organizations. That means the study is structurally unable to distinguish and give 
value to ―importance‖ and ―unimportance‖ of these mechanisms. Some 
organizations may be more important or credible than others or their policy fields 
may constitute a larger interest for Turkey. This type of neglected limitation 
regrettably is existent however; the value for being able to systematically outline 
the efforts of Turkey should outweigh the imperfection from not covering all the 
constituents of the Turkish foreign policy. Although it may be regarded as a 
minimal simplification, such an approach can subsequently create an ability to 
compare possible explanations as to why Turkish multilateral cooperation efforts 
successively expand to other regions over time.  
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2.2 How to explain successive effort for multilateral 
cooperation? 
2.2.1 Theoretical guideline 
To compare that a specific hypothesis has a better capacity for explaining why a 
state would give effort to multilateral cooperation, an initial explanation is needed 
on the theoretical bases.
51
 In this study, the accepted base assumption is that, 
states are regarded as rational and conscious choice makers where their accepted 
strategies are the result of rational calculations.
52
 Albeit, alternative ways of 
explaining international relations exist, commonly known with their attached 
―post‖ prefixes, those types of theories are regarded as to generally not have the 
goal or the capacity to produce falsifiable hypotheses, so they are not further 
included.
53
 To go more into detail with the rationality premise, two additional 
assumptions are also necessary to study cooperative behavior. Firstly, states 
devise their preferences in relation to their preferred consequences and in relation 
to their favored way of achieving these preferences. Secondly, these preferences 
are situated to the expected attitudes of others.
54
 Thereby, an effort for 
cooperation is perceived as a consequence of strategic interactions among actors. 
To continue on this line, an observation of cooperation at its simplest point 
means: overlapping interests and the identification of agreeing a way of pursuing 
these interests among actors.
55
 This general formulation proposes an advantage 
for highlighting the ―agreement among theories in its empty form, it also helps to 
clarify how various theories differ in their propositions about evolving 
cooperation … [and] emphasizing the research problem over the labels.‖56 To put 
it simply, explanatory power is highlighted instead of theoretical contest which is 
the aim of this study.  
Moving forward on this reference point, conditioning on the theory, other 
types of variables can be introduced. The current international relations theories 
offer two helpful ways for explaining cooperation under this framework.
57
 They 
cannot be considered mutually exclusive explanations but one would focus more 
into the institutions while the latter to the events of the external environment. 
Nevertheless, for explaining the successive effort for multilateral cooperation 
mechanisms, realist hypothesizes stand at a better point for deduction here. The 
primary reason for that comes from the ―power struggle‖ focus of this study 
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where the cooperative efforts are regarded as means to achieving power in relation 
to other actors.  
As highlighted, this study does not aim to seek explanatory power of theory on 
efficacy of these efforts but seek to develop the explanatory power of theory on 
the effort itself. Maria Strömvik‘s study on the EU‘s collective foreign policy in 
―To Act as a Union‖ is a good example of this point, where the analysis looks into 
reasons for why states in the EU successively attempt to develop cooperation in 
foreign policy.
58
 The study uses both of the theories, however, in that case an 
established EU mechanism already exists for pursuing cooperation. Whereas, this 
study aims to analyze the efforts of establishment or application of these types of 
mechanisms that are yet to exist with different states successively. The 
motivations for focusing on the realist tradition at this point can also be inferred 
by authors who focus on institutions as Robert Keohane says; ―writers who are 
concerned principally with international institutions and rules, or analysts in the 
Marxist tradition, make use of some Realist premises.‖59 Consequently, two 
different propositions will be highlighted in the following sections of this chapter. 
2.2.2 The threat of the external? 
When a study aims to seek out an explanation on efforts for cooperation stemming 
from an aspect such as power struggle, the realist explanations can be regarded as 
one of the first places to look at. Nevertheless, while a positive eagerness to 
explain such phenomena exists by this tradition, the same synergy however cannot 
be claimed on its opinions. The underlying reason is the well-known realist 
assumption that states are by default inclined to conflict with the international 
institutions having only a marginal effect.
60
 Therefore, conceiving conflict as the 
centrality of the international politics tends conclude somewhat pessimistic views 
on the idea of cooperation even when states have common interests
61
. Howbeit, 
the mainstream realist framework presents two considerations for approaching 
this occurrence.
62
  
The first way to account for this phenomenon is the opinion that cooperation 
is the result of a single powerful actor controlling its environment. An overall 
simplification can be made as; any formation or maintenance of formation in the 
international system depends on its hegemon.
63
 However, this explanation cannot 
be taken into consideration within this study for some obvious reasons. The 
primary reason, emanates from the belief in the ―hegemonic stability thesis‖ as 
not possibly accounting for an explanation on Turkey‘s active and successive 
efforts for cooperation with multiple numbers of divergent actors simultaneously. 
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Secondly, this point of view would not be able to sufficiently explain the efforts 
on ―system-wide patterns of cooperation that benefit many countries without 
being tied to an alliance system directed against an adversary.‖ 64 These types of 
efforts are also identifiable for Turkey. 
Thereby, the next opinion is considered to be more viable which proposes to 
explain cooperation on the grounds of balancing a significantly powerful actor. 
Accordingly, an expectation of such a cooperative behavior is assumed to rise by 
the states for protecting ―themselves from states or coalitions whose superior 
resources could pose a threat.‖65 Nonetheless, few clarifications are needed for 
using the ―balance of power‖ theory under the motivation of creating a falsifiable 
hypothesis.  
First, there exists a need to further expand on the term ―actor‖. It is true that 
the realist tradition centers the state as the main actor within the international 
system, however, the conceptualization is not by default limited to the 
contemporary understanding of the term. Robert Gilpin has also touched upon this 
issue by acknowledging the fact that the state is the principle actor: 
in that the nature of the state and the pattern of relations among 
states are the most important determinants of the character of 
international relations at any given moment. This argument does not 
presume that states need always be the principal actors, nor does it 
presume that the nature of the state need always be the same and that 
the contemporary nation-state is the ultimate form of political 
organization. Throughout history, in fact, states and political 
organizations have varied greatly: tribes, empires, fiefdoms, city-
states, etc.
66
  
Thus, while seeking balancing behavior towards an actor, the word actor can take 
place in the form of a state as well as a coalition of states under a unitary 
collective umbrella. 
Secondly, the concept of ―power‖ is also in need for further conceptualization 
because ―depending on how we define power […] we will arrive at very different 
expectations‖67 about when the Turkish efforts for multilateral cooperation should 
escalate. Jeffrey Hart‘s insights prove to be helpful for defining power at this 
instant.
68
 His study highlights three approaches to take account for power. The 
first approach; power over resources is presumably the most widely accepted and 
pursued way of studying the national power in international relations.
69
 A leading 
figure in this tradition, Kenneth Waltz, supported this view by arguing that the 
most powerful states are often the ones who have the biggest rankings in terms of 
population, territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military and 
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competence.
70
 Thus, a prediction is made on ―nations which score high on some 
indicators but low on others will tend to behave in a hostile manner toward other 
nations‖.71 Under the set boundaries of power then, material power is interpreted 
as the most significant constituent. Usually within this tradition, it is not a far-
fetched claim to see military resources as the most important aspect of material 
power.
72
 
Rationally, an observation to balance then should be along an inspection on 
efforts for increasing material assets against the adversary. If this was the case, the 
efforts would be expected to constitute attempts on international organizations for 
increasing certain material resources, preferably military assets. Conversely, this 
is not observable in the Turkish example. Within this type of balance of power, an 
observable behavior for the Turkish cooperation efforts can be argued to exist 
during the Cold War period when Turkey sought to be a member of the NATO 
against the Soviet Union.
73
 However, such a claim would be weak for the 
cooperation efforts of the time period covered here. Primarily because, no effort 
can be observed on joining or creating organizations for pooling of military 
resources directed against an adversary. In addition, the explanation would not be 
communicable for the efforts on cultural and political multilateral cooperation 
organizations. Therefore, the conception of power as resources is not accounted to 
be within the interest of this study. 
The next definition stands at a more relevant place and it is also a conception 
well known to the students of international relations.
74
 Robert Dahl‘s constitution 
of power as the capability of an actor to get another to do something which would 
not have been the case otherwise
75
 is the conceptualization of power as control 
over actors. Here, power is not only regarded as the amount of material power but 
as also the ability to pursue another actor to act in a desired way. Power can be 
coercive and non-coercive which implicitly means an actor can get another ―to do 
something which he would not have done by using threat or persuasion.‖76 With 
the coercive aspect of power, Stephen Walt‘s ―balance of threat‖ interpretation 
reflects upon this conception. The emphasis is given to the importance of an 
aggressive power. The argument proposes a powerful actor or overwhelming 
material resources to not necessarily generate balancing behavior by itself; instead 
it is argued to be generated against the actor who poses the most threat.
77
  The 
term ―threat‖ is not limited to a certain spectrum however the most general way of 
identification is by distinguishing ―aggressive intentions‖. Thus, any kind of 
perceived aggressive intention would be a possible foundation for the inception of 
a threat.
78
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Walt also identifies another significant difference from the balance of power 
theory; the possibility of a balancing behavior with political means. The argument 
exemplifies the inter-Arab relations where the observed balancing was through 
political cooperation directed against the legitimacy of the threatening states.
79
 
The significance is the presentation of militarily insignificant alliances having 
profound effects with political cooperation. For adapting the suggested examples 
then, under the pressure of a threatening actor, such a balancing behavior may 
possibly emerge through efforts of applying or creating these mechanisms like 
international organizations. In short, a perception of threat may pursue states to 
adapt the set strategies and push the need for further cooperation efforts in 
international organizations. 
To see if this theoretical explanation has any accountability to explain the 
Turkish efforts, chapter four will be dedicated to try out and analyze the relations 
with the Soviet Union/Russia as a significantly threatening actor for Turkey‘s 
national security in the timespan covered within this study. The contrast will be 
made between the efforts of multilateral cooperation and the periods of 
threatening relations with the Soviet Union/Russia. The sources of materials to 
identify ―periods of threatening relations‖ will be mainly based on the given facts, 
analyses and documents in Baskın Oran‘s ―Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006‖80 
which can be regarded as an encyclopedia comprehensively covering the major 
events that are in focus here. In addition, multiple secondary sources will be used 
for supporting reliability.   
2.2.3 The desire for influence? 
The last definition is the power as control over events and outcomes. Arguably, 
this approach to power is regarded as the most conducive conceptualization in 
contemporary international relations.
81
 The suggestion is to measure power in 
terms of an actor‘s capability to influence events in its surrounding environment 
with a differentiating stand point from the ―power over resources‖ and ―power 
over actors‖ frameworks. Simply, the justification is that ―unless the actors regard 
control over other actors or resources as valuable in themselves, then the ability to 
control actors and resources will be considered secondary to the ability to control 
events.‖82 Here, influence is not regarded as coercive threats or persuasion but 
more of an ability to achieve preferred outcomes.
83
 The preferred outcomes are 
detailed in terms of their production of a ―net increase in the actor‘s utility, where 
utility is simply a function of the actor‘s preferences over the set outcomes.‖84 
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To analyze balancing behavior in EU foreign policy development, Strömvik 
has revised three initial assumptions. Firstly, states are regarded by default to seek 
maximization of influence. Then, in contrast to the balance of threat argument, the 
second assumption is based on the balancing behavior to be ―in relation to the 
most influential actor in the system‖. Lastly, an analogy has been made with the 
formational reasons for military alliances among states where institutionalized 
cooperation in high politics is assumed to be the result of a cost-benefit 
calculation between influence gains and autonomy losses.
85
 
While supporting the first assumption, this study aims to elaborate with few 
additional insights on the latter two for important reasons. Even though the 
importance of the most influential actor in the system is vital in most cases, 
disregarding the significance of geographic proximity may lead to somewhat 
neglecting conclusions in explaining complex balancing behavior for specific 
actors or regions. An additional analogy from the constituents of Walt‘s 
arguments can be useful for consideration. This is motivated from the presented 
different sources of threats in the balancing acts of the Middle-East.
86
 To 
complement the assumption of geographic proximity, the agenda priority of a 
state needs to be deliberated. This emanates from the points made within the 
balance of threat theory on the necessity of having a threatening state with 
aggressive intentions for triggering a balancing behavior. To put it simply, the 
identification of the most influential actor within proximity can be debated; 
however, the additional criterion of agenda priority will help us to neglect further 
subjective discussions because of the simple fact that the most influential actor 
within the proximity of a state, may depend on the state itself. Thus, the analogous 
consideration of the aggressive intentions as the most prioritized influential actor 
within the proximity can prove a more precise focus. 
The last issue rests upon the third assumption of the understanding of 
―institutionalized cooperation in high politics field‖. Although, the discussion 
about cooperation in high politics may be regarded simply on matters concerning 
national security, the traditional distinction with matters of economics as low 
politics has been argued to become somewhat obscure in the contemporary 
literature.
87
 Norrin Ripsman argues such a division to be artificial and 
inappropriate within the political realist and neorealist tradition. Rather, the 
arguments suggest the realist acknowledgement of the complimentary attributes 
that economic policy has on defense policy. In this fashion, the argument 
concludes that ―the realist hierarchy of issue areas has been greatly exaggerated 
by the security studies literature to exclude economic matters, which has led to an 
unwarranted dismissal of the political economy of the national security.‖88 To say 
the least, such an interpretation on explaining efforts of cooperation becomes even 
more complicated. To illustrate, in the realist tradition an emphasis needs to be 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
85 Stömvik 2005, p. 142 
86 Walt 1987, p. 153 
87 Ripsman & Paul 2005, p. 223 
88 Ripsman 2006, p. 15 
  20 
given on the necessity ―to distinguish between say, economic policies that are 
undertaken for their own sake and economic policies that are the instruments of a 
political policy—a policy, that is whose economic purpose is but the means to the 
end of controlling policies of another nation.‖89 Hence, as also pointed out within 
the reformulated definition of effort for cooperation, the forethought of intention 
proves itself to be essential for any sort of future application. That means, an 
assumption is needed on the intention of any type of cooperative behavior as 
means for complementing national security. Supposing that, the intention of 
economic cooperation is regarded to be complementing the intention of 
cooperation in high politics field, then, the consideration of efforts for economy 
based international organizations becomes crucial. The same allegory also applies 
for efforts on cultural multilateral cooperation mechanisms. 
The explanatory power of the balance of influence predictions will be tested in 
chapter five with the proposition: the Turkish successive efforts for multilateral 
cooperation should be observable when the desire for influence in the external 
environment is at a need for balancing. The need should be at its strongest when 
the most prioritized influential actor in proximity pursues policies which may 
significantly reduce the influence capabilities of Turkey. This study interprets the 
most influential actor in the agenda and proximity of Turkey as the European 
Union. If the explanatory power of the theory is in harmony with the empirical 
data, we should observe establishment or application of international 
organizations as an effort of multilateral cooperation following times of 
considerably differing preferences or clash of interests within the EU-Turkey 
relations. These occurrences will be considered to have a triggering effect for the 
Turkish will of multilateral cooperation efforts to gain and secure the ability to 
influence in its external environment. As with the previous, the material in this 
chapter will mainly follow Baskın Oran‘s ―Turkish Foreign Policy 1919-2006‖ 
supported by multiple secondary sources.   
2.2.4 The questions of congruence, causation, comparison and 
generalization? 
The general aim for tests of congruence in case studies is to establish ―harmony‖ 
between the relative strength, duration of hypothetical predictions and observed 
outcomes.
90
 The research should address whether the hypothetical causes amplify 
or diminish the theoretical reasoning through the presentation of congruity in the 
explanations. Although, providing consistency between theoretical prediction and 
empirical data often support causal interpretation, a reliable analysis ideally needs 
to present ―safeguards‖ to deter spuriousness.91 The aspect of causality with 
congruence is that even if consistency can be observed between a prediction and a 
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variable through immense numbers of cases, there will not be certainty. The 
appearance of congruence does not necessarily support causality nor able to deny 
it. Moreover, a claim of congruence does not presuppose necessity or sufficiency 
of the predictions.
92
 Strictly speaking, a discussion about causality in international 
relations is largely settled on the grounds of the ―likelihood‖ of a theoretical 
explanation.
93
 Therefore, the evidence of congruence mostly proves the causality 
to be rather as ―contributing.‖94 Even if an outcome is incongruent with the 
proposed arguments in the future cases, there cannot be denial to the chance of 
observing an established congruence argument. Here, the advantage of 
congruence analysis is the inherited vertical and horizontal methodological 
elements for control against epistemological relativism. The vertical element for 
control emerges through ―deducing specific propositions and concrete predictions 
from abstract theories; and comparing these deduced expectations with empirical 
observations.‖95  After the establishment of congruity with the theory and data, 
horizontal element of control is secured through the presentation of ―higher level 
of empirical congruence than other theories, that it predicts crucial aspects of the 
empirical process more correctly than other theories or that it leads to additional 
causal implications that are empirically corroborated and useful for theory 
development.‖96 There is stronger indication for confidence in the explanations by 
precisely deducing the implications of general theories.
97
 Thus, by comparing the 
two hypotheses within this study and their congruence between the predictions 
and the data, we may possibly arrive to convincing arguments on whether a set of 
causal explanation is powerful and valid. 
On a final note, ideally a congruence analysis should also identify if there may 
be other cases which the argued enabling factors give out similar observable 
implications.
98
 That is, to see if there can be a possibility of generalization for a 
divergent numbers of cases. At this instant, it is necessary to point out that the 
conclusions from this study apply exclusively to the ―black-box‖ of the Turkish 
foreign policy. The study can only stand as an example for further cross-case 
comparative studies. To say the least, to conduct such a study few elemental 
enabling factors need to be taken in to considerations which are not discussed in 
detail here. For further speculation on these factors an analyst should ―immerse 
himself or herself in the rich details of the historical case being examined.‖99 One 
major example of an enabling factor would be the belief within the importance of 
Turkey‘s geostrategic and geopolitical position in the international system for the 
cooperation efforts to be taken seriously by the engaged states and actors. Without 
such leverage, an actor pursuing these efforts possibly would not meet with as 
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welcoming answers. Another factor would be the particularity of Turkey‘s 
relations with the EU. While being the only country to be integrated as much 
without holding the membership of the EU, Turkey is also the champion of the 
duration of time spent at the door of the waiting room. With such a unique 
relationship, a possibility for a unique foreign policy behavior is surely 
significant. A comparable candidate would ideally need to have in common some 
of the characteristics that are existent in the Turkish example. 
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3 Twenty-six years of multilateral 
cooperation efforts 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1978 Yearbook of International 
Organizations identifies four different categories or types of international 
organizations. The motivation to choose the conventional category emanates from 
the hope of distinguishing various types of international organizations from the 
focus. As with many countries, Turkey engages in multifarious cooperation 
mechanisms which most probably cannot be counted for (or as a result of) the 
explanations argued within this study. Within the special and minimal information 
categories, the reason for exclusion is pretty obvious. As shown on Table 1; the 
organizations that belong to those categories generally are either inactive at 
present date or incapable of presenting enough information. On the other hand, 
exclusion for the international organizations belonging to the category of the other 
is motivated from the exclusive characteristics of the tasks pursued within these 
organizations. Some examples can be entertained here for easier understanding. 
One aspect of this category includes the ―organizations emanating from places, 
persons, proprietary products or other bodies.‖100 Organizations like the European 
Communications Office (ECO),
101
 the European Mediterranean Plant Protection 
Organization (EPPO),
102
 and the International Bureau of Weights and Measures 
(BIPM)
103
 or International Transport Workers Federation (ITF)
104
 fall within this 
category. Another aspect is the ―organizations having a special form, including 
foundations and funds‖. Typically, these are ―international banks, courts, training 
institutes, libraries, laboratories, etc.‖105 However, due to their specific tasks, the 
arguments in this study cannot account (nor have the aspiration) for explaining the 
efforts spent for these types of organizations, therefore they are not included. 
The category of the conventional international organizations is at the most 
general level specified as bodies that have members in at least three member 
states and do not pursue their activities in favor of any particular state. Judge‘s 
study sets out various problems on defining set criteria for distinguishing inter-
governmental and non-governmental organizations where complications arise 
from occurrences like ―agreements signed on behalf of national government 
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agencies‖ or ―bilaterilization of treaties.‖106 Therefore, the proposed solution 
(which is followed by this study) is to ―assume that an organization is 
intergovernmental if it is established by signature of an agreement engendering 
obligations between governments, whether or not that agreement is eventually 
published. If any organization declares itself to be non-governmental, it is 
accepted as such.‖107 
The list of the engaged international organizations from the official 
government website presents seventy-one candidates in total.
108
 According to the 
set criteria of time, non-EU country origin and conventional category; eighteen 
international organizations can be selected for the purposes of this paper. As a 
whole, the efforts are presented in the following Figures 1, 2, 3 for clear 
continuous visualization. The rest of the chapter is devoted for briefly 
summarizing the initiations and details of these findings. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3: 
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3.1 The Timeline 
The earliest identified organization in the timeline is the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation (BSEC). The initial foundations of the organization began in 1990 
with the proposition of former Turkish Ambassador Şükrü Elekdağ.109 The idea 
was enthusiastically followed by the then Prime Minister Turgut Özal and was 
concluded with the Bosphorus Statement in Istanbul in 1992.
110
 The initiative sets 
out to be the ―most inclusive and comprehensive organization in the wider Black 
Sea area‖111 with twelve member states. Its sole purpose lied in the establishment 
of political and economic cooperation among the countries of the Black Sea 
region to serve as a forum for cooperation in wide ranging issue areas. To add, 
within the same year, the International Organization of Turkic Culture 
(TURKSOY) began its foundations in the meetings conducted by the six founding 
member states of the Turkic world.
112
 The efforts were finalized on July 1993 
with the agreement on Principles of Activities and Establishment of 
TURKSOY.
113
 The aspired aim was to create a mechanism for cultural 
cooperation exclusive to the countries with Turkic background. In the past, this 
was considered to be a somewhat ―utopia‖114 due to the attachment of most of the 
founding countries with the former Soviet Union. 
Continuing on, in 1996, two different efforts for multilateral cooperation are 
identifiable. The first of which is pinpointed in June with the participation of 
Turkey in the foundation of the Southeast European Cooperation Process 
(SEECP).
115
 The organization aims to strengthen cooperation in economic, 
political and security related (fighting organized crime, drug trafficking and etc.) 
issue areas. Most significantly, the SEECP is the first and the only forum of 
regional cooperation which was founded and managed by the member states of 
the region. Although, the initiative was by Bulgaria; a member state of the EU,
116
 
the organization is counted to fit into the non-EU criteria since Bulgaria was not a 
member in 1996. The second effort is identified in late 1996 with the initiative of 
Turkey to establish the Developing Eight (D8). The idea behind the organization 
was put forward by the then Prime Minister Dr. Necmettin Erbakan during a 
seminar in Istanbul with the participation of eight predominantly Muslim 
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populated states
117
 stretching from South East Asia to Africa. The efforts were 
finalized by June 1997 with the Istanbul Declaration,
118
 envisaging a multilateral 
forum for economic cooperation among its members to strengthen their place in 
the global economy in a similar fashion of the Group of Eight (G8). 
The year 1998 marked the initiation of relations with the continent Africa. 
Until then, the relations between Turkey and Africa were regarded to be very 
minimal. However, with the then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ismail Cem‘s 
initiative, Turkey declared the ―Africa Action Plan‖ for setting up the bases of 
cooperation between the sides. These efforts later evolved into the setting up of 
Turkey‘s relations with the African Union.119 Another important initiative in 1998 
was the proposition by Turkey to establish the Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task 
Group (BLACKSEAFOR).
120
 The initiative envisioned a joint naval task group 
not as a military alliance towards other states, but rather as an organization for 
stimulating naval cooperation among the six Black Sea littoral states.
121
 The 
significance of the initiative was that Turkey who stood aside with the Western 
Pact during the Cold War proposed a military cooperation mechanism most 
significantly with Russia and the other former Soviet Union states. This was a 
―first‖ for a NATO country. The last development in 1998 was the Permanent 
Observer application by Turkey to the Organization of American States (OAS) in 
September. It is an inter-continental organization including all thirty-five states of 
the Americas for regional solidarity and cooperation. The application was 
accepted and granted in the same year leading to the subsequent developments of 
various cooperation agreements with the organization.
122
 
The year 1999 includes the establishment of Conference on Interaction and 
Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Turkey participated as a founding 
member which in total involves twenty-four member states in Asia. It is an inter-
governmental forum to enhance cooperation by promoting peace, security and 
stability.
123
 Turkey is considered to be one of the most active members of the 
organization where its 2010-2012 chairmanship of the organization had been 
approved to be extended for additional two years by the member states.
124
 
The year 2000 had witnessed an important development in the topic of Black 
Sea naval cooperation. After the initiative, the littoral states of the Black Sea 
signed the Letter of Intent for the establishment of BLACKSEAFOR in June,
125
 
which led to the final milestone of ―The BLACKSEAFOR Establishment 
Agreement‖ in April 2001.126 The second development of the same year was the 
announcement of Turkey to be an observer member in the Association of 
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Caribbean States (ACS).
127
 The organization‘s primary aim is to enhance trade 
and sustainable development among the countries of the Caribbean Basin.
128
 As 
with the OAS, the grant of this observer member status led to further cooperation 
agreements between the sides. In addition, Turkey actively contributed with 
increasing financial assistance to the organization in the subsequent years.
129
  
After the initiation with Africa in 1998, the continued efforts successfully led 
Turkey to be able to secure Guest Country status in the African Union by 2002 
and finally the Observer Country status by 2005.
130
 The strengthened and 
institutionalized efforts can be accountable for the declaration of Turkey‘s ―2005 
The Year of Africa‖ in its foreign policy which later led to the ―first ever Turkey-
Africa Cooperation Summit‖ in 2008, where Turkey became the African Union 
Strategic Partner.
131
 
The timeline identifies the next effort for cooperation in September 2004 when 
Turkey started initiatives with the Arab League.
132
 The organization was created 
in 1945 with the aim of strengthening the relations between the Arab countries as 
well as to stimulate bilateral cooperation in economic, cultural and social fields of 
policy.
133
 The initial engagement later evolved to the setting-up of the ―Turkish-
Arab Cooperation Forum‖ (TAF) in 2006 and its establishment in November 
2007.
134
  
In 2005, the relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were founded 
by signing of a cooperation agreement in May 2005.
135
 The organization is a 
political and economic union of the states of the Persian Gulf. Subsequent to the 
initiations, Turkey secured a Strategic Dialogue Partner status in 2008.
136
 
In 2007, Turkey initiated efforts to be an observer member in the Caribbean 
Community (CARICOM); an organization for economic integration among the 
Caribbean nations. The process has not been finalized yet. However, subsequent 
meetings and financial contributions to the organization by Turkey are 
observable.
137
 The same year also includes the first application for Guest Member 
status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Although the responses 
were regarded not to be much favorable, the application was repeated in 2009 and 
2010 which finally led to the application as Dialogue Partnership status in 
2011.
138
 
In 2008, Turkey initiated efforts for signing framework cooperation 
agreements with the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) which is an 
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economic and political bloc promoting free trade among its members in South 
America. The bloc is a constituent of the integration of the region under the Union 
of South American Nations (USAN) umbrella. Consequently, a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) establishing a political consultation and cooperation 
mechanism between the sides was signed in 2010.
139
 
The year 2009 witnessed the creation of the Cooperation Council of Turkic 
Speaking States (Turkic Council) with Turkey being
 
the host country. Through the 
development of successive historical summits spanning from 1992,
140
 the final 
decision to create a comprehensive inter-governmental political cooperation 
organization was accepted by Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.
141
 
The organization also granted open membership to the other Turkic States.
142
 
The following year, in 2010, Turkey became a signatory of the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in SouthEast Asia (TAC). Thus, established the 
foundations for sectorial cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN);
143
 an international organization for economic and political 
cooperation between ten countries.
144
 
In 2011, Turkey applied for observer membership in the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The organization is composed of 
eight South Asian states for geopolitical and economic cooperation. Turkey stated 
that the application was necessary upon the growing connections with the region 
and the member states over the years. The application is still under process as of 
2014.
145
 
This brings us to the last year of the timeline. An important development in 
2013 was the signing of the Dialogue Partnership Status with the SCO, making 
Turkey the first NATO member state ever to have ties with the organization.
146
 
Finally, the last identified development is the application by Turkey to the Asia 
Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) upon its invitation. The organization aims at 
enhancing political dialogue and economic cooperation in the Asian continent. 
The membership agreement was signed in September within the same year.
147
 
3.1.1 Diversity and Intensity 
The overall image presents a possibility for highlighting diversity on the intensity 
of efforts through different periods. The possibility to distinguish periods of high 
and low intensity concerning efforts for multilateral cooperation will give us the 
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ability to contrast the two theoretical frameworks to see if there may be possible 
explanations for these occurrences. In Figures 4, 5 and 6, these intensities are 
highlighted. Judging from the empirical data, a possibility exists for interpretation 
through two perspectives. The total number of events and the total number of 
engagements concerning new actors through our timeline presents the period of 
1987-1991 with relatively low observable efforts followed by a relative increase 
in the intensity after 1992 up until 1995. The charts present a significant spike in 
the efforts within the years of 1996-2001 followed by a relative decrease up until 
2006. Although there are observable efforts within this period, however, from 
2007 onwards; another significant spike and piling up in the efforts can be 
identified. This may not necessarily mean the previous 2002-2006 period had low 
intensity of efforts however it does certainly mean a decrease in relative terms. 
The following chapters will be dedicated for contrasting the different theoretical 
predictions according to these overall findings. 
 
Figure 4: 
 
Figure 5: 
 
Figure 6: 
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4 Balancing a Security Threat? 
The driving forces behind Turkey‘s foreign policy emanating from external 
stimuli can be emphasized as a well-known stand point. Ahmet Davutoğlu 
elaborated on this fact by highlighting the strengths of Turkey‘s foreign policy as 
reflecting on ―historical depth‖ with the consideration of geographical positioning. 
Furthermore, Davutoğlu‘s description involved an understanding on the flow of 
history where an inability to read rationally the ―long-term historical trends and an 
understanding of where we are situated in the greater trajectory of world history‖ 
would lead to greater consequences to pay. Therefore, self-reflection is 
understood to be crucial in terms of acquiring the revisions to be made on 
Turkey‘s position in times of necessity.148 
This way of interpreting the driving forces inevitably leads to questions of 
what kind of historical trends or self-reflection in regards to whom that Turkey 
positions itself in its foreign policy? Simply then, the actual question should be: 
what kind of external stimuli drives Turkey‘s foreign policy? 
4.1 The Balance of Threat Argument in a nutshell 
For the students of the realist tradition, an observation of cooperation between 
states most often imply that a balancing situation may be taking place as weaker 
actors attempt to alter the power ratios with regards to the powerful actors.
149
 As 
discussed in chapter two, the general balance of power propositions assume the 
constant need for security in the anarchic international system where an increase 
in power is necessary for increasing security.
150
 Therefore, an observance of 
cooperation is an indication for attempting a change in power. Building upon this 
base line, the balance of threat argument differentiates on its reasoning for 
causation on why such a balancing behavior takes place as well as the means to 
exert such behavior. First, the rising power needs to have aggressive intentions for 
triggering a balancing behavior and that such a balancing act can be through 
political cooperation as well as military.
151
 The concept of aggressive intentions 
for simplicity can be summarized as ―expansionist ambitions.‖152 In addition, 
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within the concept of a ―threatening state‖, variables like ―aggregate power‖ 
where the total resources of a state as well as its ability to direct this aggregate 
power at an acceptable cost as an offensive power against other states, need to be 
considered.
153
 Lastly, the importance of the geographic proximity is emphasized 
due to the converse parallel between distance and power projection. 
With these aspects in mind, it can be claimed that an observation on efforts for 
cooperation may have been triggered by changes in the perception of a threat 
facing the national security. The changes in a ―major power‘s resources, its 
offensive capabilities, or its geographical proximity may affect the perceived need 
for balancing.‖154  
4.1.1 The need to balance USSR/Russia and the expected empirical 
development 
The discussion of cooperation against the USSR/Russia is a rather familiar one in 
Turkey‘s foreign policy. The antagonist relations throughout their historical span 
of 500 years with ―economic, political, historic and cultural bearings have 
impacted each other, and the other countries and communities with which they 
entered into relations.‖155 Especially, the arguments discussing causation for 
Turkey‘s cooperation efforts during the period of 1991 to 2001 tend to commonly 
refer to the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of new Turkic Republics in 
Central Asia. These types of arguments develop on the new horizon of 
opportunities for cooperation which Turkey had encountered for altering or filling 
the vacuum left of the Russian dominance in the region.
156
 This is not surprising 
considering Prime Minister Özal‘s opinions on USSR‘s collapse in 1991, as an 
important opportunity to apprehend leadership for the first time in 400 years, 
which the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TGNA) must not miss.
157
 
Conformably, the Economist’s controversial review of ―Turkic world from 
Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall‖ became highly popular amongst the researchers 
and the officials at the time.
158
 This development inevitably resulted in a strained 
relationship with the displeased heir Russia.
159
 Thereby, in order to establish a 
somewhat balance and deter Russia from possible future threats, Turkey found 
itself a part in a new ―Great Game‖ for power in Central Asia.160 Accordingly, in 
periods where an assertive Russian foreign policy and mutual confrontations are 
identifiable, an increase in the efforts could be justified. Perhaps, the 
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repercussions from this power struggle are accountable for explaining the foreign 
policy behavior of Turkey after all? 
4.2 The Impact of Soviet Union and Russia 
The 1987 decision to apply for full membership into the European Union took 
place at a point where ―change‖ could have been one of the primary labels which 
described the developments in the new world order. The events which lead to the 
expiration of the USSR from the political arena were inevitably going to have 
repercussions among the political strategists of Turkey‘s foreign policy. 
Highlighting and reflecting upon the structural changes that took place between 
the sides may give light to the needed insights.  
4.2.1 The period for ―change‖ 1987-1991 
Arguably, after the period of stagnant relations in early 1980s due to the military 
coop taking place in Turkey, the bilateral relations witnessed a new opening in the 
second half of the decade. Turkey was going through a grand phase of economic 
restructuring from the import-substitution lead policies to the export-led growth. 
Meanwhile, the USSR was introducing the new comprehensive restructuring 
guidelines of perestroika for economic and foreign policy in 1985.
161
 Partly owing 
to these grand changes within the internal propellants of the sides, the introduction 
of new bilateral cooperation arrangements witnessed many ―firsts‖ in regards to 
economic and political relations. The year 1987 was the agreed commencement 
for the Natural Gas Agreement which was signed back in 1984. Its significance 
was that Turkey had agreed to buy 120 million cubic meters of gas for the 
duration of twenty-five years from the USSR. In exchange, the USSR agreed on 
spending 70% of the earned foreign exchange from these sales on Turkish goods 
and services.
162
  It was regarded as a chance to enter the Russian market for the 
first time before the collapse of the Berlin Wall which was a breakthrough for 
Turkey.
163
 Although the ability to diversify the energy sources with the other 
block can be regarded as a substantial political development in itself, the exported 
products from Russia also radically increased from 25% to 70% within the period 
of 1986 to 1991.
164
 Furthermore, in 1989, the Agreement on Border and Coastal 
Trade was signed which stimulated the economic development in the bordering 
regions.
165
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Following the rapid improvements in bilateral economic cooperation, the 
political relationship also began to see an unprecedented rise. The period of 1986 
to 1990 was the agreed outset of the Agreement for the Exchange of Goods and 
the Cultural and Scientific Exchange Program by the bilateral visits of 1984. In 
addition, in 1988, few important developments took place. The decision of the 
USSR to give up on the demand of solving the Cyprus conflict through 
international conference and the removal of the SS-20 missiles located in 
Kapustin region near Turkey, resulted with the opening of the Sarp border 
passage. Moreover, with the signing of a protocol, the twenty year old Flight 
Information Region (FIR) line was changed, resulting with an answer to the 
problem of movement of a political refuge in the Turkish embassy in Moscow.
166
 
Lastly, the years 1989-1990 witnessed the negotiations for the limitation of 
conventional forces in Europe. Its critical importance was the consent of the 
USSR on excluding the southeastern region of Turkey for limiting the number of 
forces from the agreement.
167
 
In regards to the general structure of the relations, the period was undeniably 
positive bilaterally due to the increased nature of economic and political 
cooperation. This was supported especially with the advantageous developments 
for Turkey concerning the surrounding military status quo. Thus, for the 
arguments of a threat for Turkey, the pre-collapse period of the USSR could only 
be labeled as a diminishing one. This is identifiable at the time of the 1990 
Russian intervention in Azerbaijan. The initial official level response was to 
consider it as an ―internal‖ problem of the USSR which Turkey was not a side of 
even with the highly negative internal public reaction.
168
 As for the timeline, the 
diminishing Soviet threat before its collapse then may be regarded accountable for 
explaining the observable low intensity of efforts for multilateral cooperation in 
this period.   
4.2.2 ―Turkic world from the Adriatic Sea to the Chinese Wall‖ 
1992-1995  
After the drastic developments of 1991, the establishment of the new world order 
brought about many unexpected results to the relations.
169
 The new independent 
states in Central Asia as well as the internal turmoil of the USSR steadily created 
an impact where the bilateral relations were moving towards a period of 
―uncertainty.‖170 Without much resistance to the pressure by the public and the 
press for apprehending the responsibilities in the region, Turkey completely 
delineated the Moscow focus to the new successor states by the end of 1991. 
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During the Cold War, the security and foreign policy of Turkey was based on 
the strategic importance it associated to the Western allies. However, while the 
conclusion of the Cold War may have meant a more secure environment for the 
Europeans, Turkey was faced with an emerging turbulent environment of regional 
conflicts on all frontiers which created the perception of threat. Further 
complications derived from the fear of abandonment by the Western Allies which 
―shook Turkey‘s security policies to the core and led to an urgent reappraisal of 
possible threats to its security in the post-Cold War era.‖171 This meant an active 
engagement with the region for eliminating Russian dominance in its own 
favor.
172
 The declaration of Azerbaijan‘s independence on October 1991 could be 
regarded as one of the early signals for the traits of this period. By not declining 
the request, Turkey became the first country recognizing Azerbaijan. However, 
cautious steps were taken on not recognizing other declarations until the 
agreement on Minsk for establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS).
173
 After the agreement clearly concluding the USSR, Turkey took the first 
spot in the list of recognition for all the fifteen newly independent states.
174
 
By 1992, through the initiative of Turkey, the first ―Summit of Head of States 
of Turkish Speaking Countries‖ was conducted with the opening speech of the 
Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel on the ―creation of a Turkic World from 
Adriatic Sea to Chinese Wall.‖175 Further advice was given on leaving the Soviet 
currency
176
 and the Russian alphabet
177
 as well as propositions on military aid and 
construction of pipelines by Demirel.
178
 These statements started to alarm the 
Russian officials who were especially antagonized to see attempts on the future 
routes of oil and gas pipelines.
179
 The unwelcoming reply from Russia 
disapproved such meetings on the basis of ethnicity and labeled them as an 
expression of ―militant nationalism‖ which Demirel responded as the right of free 
will of the CIS leaders.
180
 
Meanwhile, the dissolution of the USSR already had elevated the conflict 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh into full scale warfare. 
The initial neutral stance back in 1990s disappeared and together with the support 
of public, Turkey was officially the only country from the beginning supporting 
Azerbaijan.
181
 The TGNA started to discuss the need for direct military 
intervention with full support from all the parties especially after the Khojaly 
Massacre by the Armenian and CIS forces taking place in 1992.
182
 However, by 
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late 1992, Armenia had agreed to sign an arrangement with Russia giving the 
permission for Russian military bases and deployment of troops near Turkey‘s 
borders.
183
 After the intensification of public outcry and discussions for military 
intervention, a serious warning from Russia came through the General of CIS 
Armed Forces Yevgeny Shaposhnikov‘s statement on the possibility of a Turkish 
intervention in the conflict to ―lead to the third world war.‖184 Being aware of the 
risk of direct confrontation with Russia and low support from the NATO, cautious 
steps were taken. One example is the rejection of the request by Azerbaijan to 
Turkey for sending helicopters to evacuate civilians.
185
 Nevertheless, the 
Armenian occupation of Kelbedjer in 1993 elevated the official state level 
responses
186
 even so far as President Özal‘s daring statement; ―what if some 
bombs fell on the Armenian side of the border in the course of military exercises 
in the region?‖187 The tension did not seem to decrease after the death of Özal 
within the same year. His successor, Tansu Çiller announced ambition for 
authorization of the TGNA for declaring war if Armenia was to invade 
Nakhchevan and violate the Kars Treaty signed in 1921. Turkey is a side of the 
peace treaty which marks the borders in the Caucasus region. The ultimatum was 
due because of further suspicions on an invasion by Armenia to Nakhchevan over 
the course of the conflict.
188
  As Turkey was unable to resist its public sentiment 
and began to adopt the situation as a matter of national security with Russia on 
full support with Armenia, the question of danger for Turkey can be said to 
become an unfortunate reality. 
The relations were further deteriorated when Turkey accepted a visit by the 
Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev who was fighting for independence with 
Russia in 1993. The meeting resulted with the summoning of the Turkish 
ambassador in Moscow for asking Turkey to not to take part in this question.
189
 
Chechens had gained substantial support by the Turkish public even so far as 
volunteers for fighting their cause in the region. The main partial reason for this 
emanated from the religious communality of Islam.
190
 Russia accused Turkey for 
turning a blind eye on these developments and interpreted these acts as support. 
At the same time, the party of the Kurdish separatist movement (PKK) in Turkey 
was gaining support in Moscow which was an indication of the answer of 
Russia.
191
 
The second Turkic Summit was scheduled to take place in 1994. By then, the 
opposition of Russia on these meetings became visible among the participants. 
Under the request of Yeltsin, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan requested a 
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postponement for the Turkic Summit.
192
 By 1995, The Kurdish Parliament in 
exile had conducted its third meeting in Moscow with the support of the Russian 
Duma.
193
 With the introduction of the ―Kurdish card‖194 ―Turkey was highly 
alarmed about Russia‘s intentions in the region‖ which inflated the need to 
deterrence in the interest of Ankara.
195
 
As for visible effects on the timeline, the number of new engagements and the 
number of events were increased implying harmony with the theoretical 
predictions. However, there can be two different possible conclusions from these 
findings, both of which will not present strong arguments for congruence. First 
and foremost, in the period of 1992-1995, the focus was directed upon multilateral 
engagements with most significantly Russia as well as the successor states which 
could be interpreted rather as a step-up policy. A supporting bilateral example 
would be the 1993 comprehensive arms sale of armored vehicles, helicopters and 
conventional weapons from Russia to Turkey, which was a first for a NATO 
country.
196
 Clearly, this would not be the prediction of a policy development by 
the balance of threat proposition. Secondly, with arguably the worst period of 
bilateral relations within this study, the identified activeness of Turkey‘s foreign 
policy seems relatively low with no significant spikes which become clearer when 
observed with the following period. Thus, with diverging results; this period is at 
best inconclusive to show harmony with the predictions.  
4.2.3 Normalization 1996-2001 
The period of 1996 to 2001 initially began with political repercussions stemming 
from the previous tensions. In 1996, the treaty for limiting the number of 
conventional forces in the Caucasus was revised upon the rejection of Russia 
where the Turkish position was disregarded by the compromise with the West.
197
 
Thus, the military presences around Turkey‘s borders reappeared which 
subsequently altered the military balance of the region in 1997 ―creating a new 
source of tension in Turkish-Armenian relations.‖198 Additionally, the sale of S-
300 missiles by Russia to Cyprus received highly distressing responses for its 
potential to alter the Turkish military balance on the island.
199
 The following year, 
in 1998, the tensions were elevated with the leader of the PKK refuge in Russia 
where the Russian Duma appealed for the cause.
200
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Meanwhile, as with Azerbaijan, Turkey was intensifying cooperation with 
Georgia. However, the pro-Turkish president of Azerbaijan‘s Abulfaz Elchibey 
was removed from office to the ex-KGB agent and a representative of the pro-
Russian faction Heydar Aliyev in 1993 which Turkey had felt great resent.
201
 
Similar internal rivalries were also taking place in Georgia. The support of the 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze for oil pipelines to go through Turkey 
was antagonist to the Russian demands. After surviving an assassination attempt 
in 1995 and a military uprising in 1998, Shevardnadze blamed the involvement of 
Russia for supporting the perpetrators.
202
 To support Georgia on stabilizing 
national security, Turkey undertook military cooperation and aid arrangements in 
1997.  A strategic partnership was concluded in 2000 for granting permission to 
the Turkish Air Force to use air bases in Georgia.
203
 
Nonetheless, the relations within this period could be argued an improvement 
bilaterally. The missile crisis in Cyprus was calmed down with the installation to 
Greece
204
 and the Duma‘s request for the Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan was 
rejected.
205
 The Turkish stance on the second Chechen War in this period also 
differed in contrast to the first with the coinciding high level visit of Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit in Moscow resulting with a joint declaration on 
combatting terrorism in 1999.
206
 The political high level visits were joined by 
military cooperation with the initiative of Turkey to create the collective joint 
naval task force BLACKSEAFOR, marking a first time for Turkey to be in a joint 
contingent with Russia as well as a first time for a NATO country.
207
 An 
agreement for building a pipeline for gas (The Blue Stream Pipeline) was signed 
in 1997 envisaging an annual purchase of 16 million cubic meters for twenty-five 
years.
208
 In economic terms, the Turkish trade was sticking to the Russian market 
even after the difficulties of 1998.
209
 
As shown on the timeline and the intensity trends, the period witnessed the 
second highest observation of efforts covered within this study. Hypothetically 
speaking, notwithstanding the efforts for bilateral cooperation arrangements, if the 
identified tensions were to be accounted for Turkey‘s increase in efforts then, the 
argument would be weak to explain mutual multilateral cooperation in terms of 
military within this period. On the other hand, if the interpretation was based on 
diminishing threat, then, the same weakness would apply to explaining the 
abundance of observable efforts. Therefore, this period can only be claimed 
contradictory with the theoretical predictions. 
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4.2.4 Substitution of power struggle with cooperation 2002-2006 
Naming the tension driven relations of the previous decade as ―lost years‖ in the 
bilateral relations of Turkey and Russia can be eminently justifiable.
210
 On the 
contrary, the new millennium brought about diverging improvements. As 
mentioned in chapter one, a new understanding of foreign policy implementation 
in Turkey had been argued to come forth after 2002. In regards to relations with 
Russia, these developments could be addressed with two significant examples in 
this period. The first would be the stance of Turkey on the American operation in 
Iraq. After heated debates on whether to open a frontier for deployment of 
American troops in Turkey, on the infamous 1
st
 of March 2003 voting, the TGNA 
declined the implementation of such a decision.
211
 This remarkable development 
was speculated as a possible indication for the ―departure from the traditional 
Western-oriented Turkish foreign policy.‖212 In parallel, Russia was also opposing 
such an intervention and showed appreciation to the result. Vladimir Putin 
enthusiastically claimed the crucial rejection of the decision as the ―event of the 
week.‖213 
The second example would be the amount of bilateral high level visits that 
took place during this period. In 2004, as an exception, the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül was received at the level of ―Prime Minister‖. 
In the following year alone, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Putin met 
four times which was regarded as an ―annus mirabilis (‗exceptional year‘).‖214 
Within the same year, Putin joined the inauguration of the Blue Stream Pipeline 
and in 2006 the first presidential visit since the founding of the Russian 
Federation took place.
215
 Notwithstanding minor hiccups like the Russian veto in 
the UN Security Council call for the end of the seclusion of the Turkish Cypriots 
in 2004,
216
 this period has been generally described as a major development in 
bilateral relations with the political rivalry turning into cooperation.
217
 
In comparison with the previous observations, this period with diminishing 
rivalry and assertiveness in the relations also presents a significant decrease in the 
efforts for multilateral cooperation. Although, a contradictory unsupportive 
argument can be made on the intensity of efforts within this term piling up around 
the 2004-2005 annus mirabilis, when handled in the general comprehensive 
scheme, the balance of threat predictions seems to show congruence with the 
empirical results. 
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4.2.5 Moving into a new stage in relations and beyond 2007-2013 
The previously improving bilateral relations had begun to bear their fruits in this 
period. In order to put it into context, by 2008, ―Turkey imported 65 percent (22 
million cubic meters) of its natural gas and 25 percent (8 million tons) of its oil 
from Russian sources‖218 and concluded ―59 construction projects worth USD 3.6 
billion in Russia in 2007… [in which the] construction sector was involved in 20 
billion USD worth business in 2008.‖219 The assertive Russian rhetoric could be 
argued non-existent and bilateral cooperation was enhancing in other areas than 
just economic and military. The year 2007 was named the ―Russia Year‖ in 
Turkey and vice versa 2008 was named the ―Turkey Year‖ in Russia which 
contributed to the establishment of the ―Russian-Turkish Societal Forum‖ during 
President Medvedev‘s visit in 2010. The improving relations can also be observed 
on the increase of universities teaching Russian in Turkey, where the numbers 
saw an escalation from only five universities in 2000 to seventeen in 2011.
220
 In 
addition, the negotiated ―steps towards the visa exemption were in effect realized, 
and it was declared that the visas would be removed in April 2011.‖221 Most 
spectacularly, the discussions on the relations began to center around the 
possibility of a ―strategic partnership‖222 in which Turkey arguably showed clear 
perseverance with its successive requests to be an observer member in the SCO. 
As such, one of the most remarkable milestones on this aim would be the signing 
of the ―Dialogue Partnership‖ within the SCO in 2012. It should be noted that 
even with such promising relations, significant obstacles have faced the bilateral 
relations. The stance of Turkey on the Syria crisis since 2011 and the stance of 
Russia on the decision for a NATO missile defense system in Turkey since 2010, 
created the most current discontents. Nevertheless, unlike the previous periods, 
the criticism of Russia was careful on not to harm the ongoing strategic interests 
between the sides.
223
 
In contrast, this last section of the Turkish-Russian relations coincides with the 
second biggest spike in Turkey‘s efforts for diversifying and increasing the 
number of multilateral cooperation mechanisms. Clearly, congruence cannot be 
established between the balance of threat propositions and the empirical 
observation within this period.  
4.2.6 The feasibility of the balance of threat argument 
To sum up, the findings of this chapter demonstrate that the changes in the 
perception of a threat from Russia are not in congruence with the developments in 
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Turkey‘s efforts. The analysis presents the argument to be coinciding with the 
empirical development only twice in connection with the pre-dissolution period of 
the USSR and the improved relations in 2002-2006. Interestingly, with the most 
significant tensions in the relations in the 1992-1995 period, the observable 
outcome suggests a rather escalation in the Turkish cooperation efforts towards 
Russia which would not be an anticipated prediction for balancing behavior. 
Moreover, the two highest spikes of the efforts highlighted in the timeline 
coincide with the periods of improving relations and deepening cooperation 
between the sides. At this instance, an argument can be made on whether Russia 
was actually perceived as a threat after 2000s, thereby weaken the relevance of the 
findings. However, the  plans for the reconsideration of Russia‘s status as a threat 
factor in Turkey‘s National Security Policy document (the infamous ―red book‖), 
was only very recently in 2010 which principally suggest otherwise.
224
 Thus, it is 
possible to claim that the balance of threat arguments cannot by itself present 
satisfactory harmony to explain the empirical development. The findings would in 
fact suggest an opposite where there is lesser threat from Russia the efforts for 
cooperation intensified.  The next chapter will seek to find if there may be better 
suited explanations for this occurrence. 
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5 Balancing Influence? 
The second proposition is the third conception of power: power as control over 
events and outcomes. Looking at the international order under the perspective of 
power as the ability to influence events can be regarded as an ―overlooked‖ 
argument.
225
 In terms of theory development, the study of Maria Strömvik in ―To 
Act as a Union‖ is the most scrutinized version yet that this study is aware of. 
Therefore, the insights that will be developed here will be contributing to the 
skeleton of that balance of influence framework for future adaptability and 
calibration.  
5.1 The Balance of Influence Argument in a nutshell 
As pointed out, states seek out to maximize their influence capabilities in the hope 
for gaining power. To add, the second assumption, then, would be upon 
considering the effort for cooperation as the result of a balancing strategy which is 
endeavored in relation to the most prioritized influential actor in proximity. 
Lastly, effort for institutionalized multilateral cooperation is assumed to be 
intentionally necessary for the future influence capability. A state may well spend 
effort for institutionalized multilateral cooperation in different fields with the 
intention of possible infrastructure for future cooperation in high politics field for 
securing influence capabilities. Thereby, an effort for multilateral cooperation is 
proposed to happen when an actor intentionally considers the benefits of influence 
gains as higher than the hindrance of autonomy losses. This pressure for an effort 
rises when the most prioritized influential actor in proximity poses disagreements 
that potentially will damage the self-influential capabilities and thereby the power 
of the state. Thus, the need for an effort in multilateral cooperation mechanisms 
will emerge in order to balance the possible future incapability. Conversely, if the 
most prioritized influential actor in proximity pursues strategies that fall in line 
with the balancing state, the need to cooperate, thereby, the need to influence 
would be lower. To highlight, this need to balance ―may equally materialize 
among the closest of allies‖, where there are disagreements in the context of 
security.
226
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5.1.1 The need to balance the EU influence and the expected 
empirical development  
The Turkish case with the candidacy can argued to be one of a kind in the history 
of the EU, largely owing to Turkey‘s ―longest waiting applicant‖ title. It may be 
ironic to suggest that a country, who persistently seeks to become part of the EU, 
pursues strategies to balance its influence in the external environment. However, 
when one looks into the details of this interesting relationship, significant features 
answer this dilemma. At this point, basic facts will be helpful to understand 
briefly why this argument may not be ironic at all. Turkey is part of the Customs 
Union as envisioned for the possibility of full membership.
227
 Not surprisingly, 
the top trading partner is the EU, taking up 37% of Turkey‘s total trade with the 
world. In contrast, Turkey holds only 3.7% within the EU‘s total trade.228 The 
biggest foreign direct investment (FDI) to Turkey comes from the EU, with 70% 
of the total FDI.
229
 Thus, in terms of economics, Turkey is highly dependent on 
the EU. In terms of security, Turkey was part of the Western European Union 
(WEU) and one of the early contributors to the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) with extensive input regarding aerial support in the military 
operations. In total, Turkey participated in seven EU missions especially within 
regions where a substantial historical Turkish interest exists.
230
 The contributions 
in these frameworks also partly emanated from the candidate status.
231
 To put it 
simply, the possibility of a negative result in the candidacy bears a significant 
possible impact for the status-quo of Turkey‘s many current alignments. Such an 
impact would undeniably affect influence capabilities mainly considering 
Turkey‘s relative lack of independent relations with the rest of its external 
environment. Notwithstanding the likelihood of such a result, rationally, a country 
who seeks to lay out its foreign policy aims on the grounds of global influence
232
 
should at least be expected to consider the slightest possibility of capability 
degradation emerging from its contemporary positioning. 
This discussion on the need to balance the EU for securing influence 
capabilities can often be implicitly identifiable among the Turkey-EU relations 
analyses. The arguments generally touch upon Turkey‘s specific cooperation 
engagements with its external environment as a somewhat result of different 
disappointments in the bilateral relations.
233
 Thus, to present a congruent balance 
of influence argument, the empirical developments should be expected to observe 
an increase in the efforts of multilateral cooperation following the times of 
disunity in Turkey-EU relations, especially during periods of significant threats to 
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the candidacy. Conversely, the efforts should be expected to decrease when the 
process witnesses significant positive developments.  
5.2 The History of the EU-Turkey Disunity 
At this instant, it is necessary to announce a brief disclaimer. The following 
presentation of disagreements and disappointments in the bilateral relations of the 
sides emanate from the need to test the theoretical predictions. Therefore, the 
incidents that are highlighted here do not intend to display an image of constant 
conflict based relationship but rather demonstrate a selective story.   
5.2.1 The initiation of hope and the first disappointment 1987-1991 
The membership application coincided with a period of growing relations with the 
EU (European Communities at the time) which was partly due to the post-coup 
structuring in Turkey starting from 1983.
234
 While the application could be 
regarded untimely, nevertheless, the then Prime Minister Özal decided to go 
through with the decision and structured the application on important initial 
elements.  
First, Turkey decided to grant its citizens the right of personal application at 
the European Commission on Human Rights in the early stages of 1987 which 
earned a lot of credit by the European Communities (EC). Secondly, by 1988, the 
Greek request to change the 1964 decree on forbidding the sale of Greek 
properties in Turkey was accepted. This second move was greatly appreciated by 
Greece which in turn approved the signing of the adjustment and supplementary 
protocol of Turkey‘s Ankara Agreement prior the meetings of the Council of 
Association (CoA) in the same year. The positive developments in the bilateral 
relations with Greece were most often regarded essential for the accession by Özal 
who continued with an additional high level visit to Athens in 1988.
235
 Thirdly, 
further demands on the debated free circulation of Turkish workers in Europe 
were decided to be dropped.  
After the application, the Turkish government intensified its efforts for an 
early consent by the EC through subsequent visits to Bonn, London and Paris.
236
 
Unfortunately, the first disappointment came through Commission‘s 1988 
decision to not to admit a new member for enlargement before 1992.
237
 The 
Turkish reaction could be regarded as ―sharp disappointment‖ with official 
statements suggesting a change of focus in the foreign policy towards east. 
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Moreover, if Turkey was to be declined, a shift towards an Islamic Union was 
brought up by the then President Kenan Evren and even a possibility of revision 
on the status of Turkey‘s NATO membership became vocal.238 As far as the EC 
was concerned, the decision was unchangeable which consisted of forethought of 
its own future agenda and Turkey‘s unlikelihood for meeting the criteria in the 
short-term.
239
 By late 1989, the Commission‘s opinion was submitted 
recommending a suspension of the application. The document also included a 
―Cooperation Program‖ which was envisioning the handling of Turkey‘s 
application through an initial establishment of a Customs Union which was 
approved by the Council of Ministers by early 1990.
240
 To curb the negative 
domestic reaction, the Turkish government appreciated the program for the 
continuation of accession.
241
 
Nonetheless, this period also witnessed the beginnings of discussions which 
were going to create significant problems for Turkey in the unforeseen future. The 
European Parliament (EP) increasingly voiced criticisms on Turkey‘s internal 
problems. The Kurdish minorities started to take considerable attention in the 
agenda of the EC as the number of human rights violations in Turkey grew 
through 1988 and 1989.
242
 In addition, Cyprus
243
 submitted its own application for 
accession in mid-1990 and was found admissible, creating greater frustration to 
Turkey‘s objections.244 Lastly, the positive developments with Greece marooned 
uncompleted by 1989 as the year witnessed a government change after Prime 
Minister Andreas Papandreou lost the elections. 
This period with the hopeful initiation of application and focus in the EC 
coincides with a low observation of efforts for multilateral cooperation in 
Turkey‘s foreign policy. Moreover, the first initiation of establishing a multilateral 
cooperation organization surrounding the Black Sea area started to take root in 
1990 following the first disappointments within the process which was speculated 
as a mere retaliation to these negative developments.
245
 Considering the period 
consisted of developments on the initiation of the application, it would not be 
feasible to classify simply as positive or negative. However, the observation of the 
first effort in the timeline being in correlation with the first disappointments may 
at least suggest that there is no contradiction but rather harmony with the 
theoretical predictions. 
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5.2.2 The change of dynamics and focus 1992-1995 
The year 1992 was significant for Turkey‘s accession hopes as much as it was 
significant for the EU‘s own agenda. The signing of the Maastricht Treaty was 
one of the most crucial events for the bilateral relations within this period. For 
Turkey, the treaty had two important outcomes. Firstly, the Article 257 of the 
Rome Treaty was amended to ―All European States may apply for membership in 
the Union‖ which created concerns for Turkey as the definition did not give a 
clear scope.
246
 Secondly, the WEU was incorporated as the implementing 
institution of the new CFSP which gave Turkey an associate member status due to 
its NATO membership. Although taking part in Europe‘s security and defense 
structures was at the upmost importance for Turkey,
247
 the exclusion of associate 
members in most of the decision making procedures created yet another 
disappointment.
248
 Later that year, the Lisbon Summit declared the initiation of 
accession talks with the EFTA countries and concluded ―no further accessions 
talks‖ regarding other candidates.249 In addition, the news from the EP kept on 
coming with more criticisms as Turkey‘s record on human rights worsened. An 
example would be the adoption of a resolution on the Rights of Kurdish People by 
the EP in June.
250
  On a positive note for this year, the Vice President of the 
Commission Martin Borgemann initiated the working program which presented 
the eagerness of the EU to continue the Customs Union process that led to its first 
committee meeting on December.
251
 
The following year, 1993, witnessed the Copenhagen Summit which included 
a statement reiterating the priority of the CU process for Turkey while announcing 
the Central and Eastern European countries for future full membership.
252
 These 
developments for the first time indicated that Turkey had lost its privileged status 
of the associate membership as the EU was shifting its enlargement focus. As 
Turkey was falling behind from the rest of the enlargement goals, the CU process 
marked the establishment of its Steering Committee and agreement on the 
subjects by the CoA at the end of 1993.
253
 Another indirect development was the 
signing of a Common Defense Doctrine between Cyprus and Greece which 
Turkey and TRNC answered with a similar alignment the following year.
254
 
In the year 1994, the Essen Summit announced that Cyprus would be among 
the next round of enlargement without any mentioning of Turkey.
255
 Furthermore, 
The EP adopted another resolution for the suspension of the scheduled CoA 
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meetings.
256
 The main reason was the ongoing closure trial of the Kurdish 
dominated political party in the TGNA which indeed led to postponement of the 
meetings until early 1995.
257
 
The last year within this period, 1995, witnessed the adoption of the CU 
decision which was declared at the rescheduled meeting in March. Unfortunately, 
when the CoA gave consent on Turkey for meeting the required conditions, the 
EP opposed again by arguing on the human rights violations and put the decision 
up to a vote. At the end, the decision was voted by majority for adoption on 13 
December 1995.
258
 
As for the observance of possible effects on the efforts for cooperation, the 
period could be regarded as diminishing hope for Turkey‘s candidacy and a 
change of focus in the EU‘s enlargement goals. Especially in the first half, 
increasing amount of disappointments are apparent for Turkey which also 
coincide with the observable efforts within this period. The second half is 
relatively inactive which corresponds with the crucial developments in the CU as 
the focus of the candidacy is diverted. Thus, with important warning signals to 
Turkey, the subsequent increases in the observable efforts of this period can be 
regarded accountable for the arguments on establishing congruity.  
5.2.3 The worst period in the Turkey-EU relations 1996-2001 
The beginning of 1996 marked the establishment of the CU
259
 and the relations 
were expected to progress into a new phase. However, shortly after, an 
unexpected turn of events shadowed the positive developments and became one of 
the first indications that the relationship was about to divert into a totally different 
path. On 31
st
 of January 1996, the Greek and Turkish Naval forces came as close 
as few hundred meters for direct confrontation over a territorial dispute on the 
rocky islet Imia/Kardak within the Aegean Sea.
260
 Although, the Kardak Crisis 
was quickly averted by the intense interference of the American officials, the 
repercussions were going to cost dearly to Turkey. The Commission declared 
solidarity with Greece by emphasizing Greece‘s borders as the EU‘s borders and 
signaled a warning to Turkey on the respect of international law for a performing 
Customs Union.
261
 The promised measures and financial aid for the CU became 
defunct later on. An indirect reason was most probably the EU Council of 
Ministers decision on 24 July 1996 which placed the responsibility fully on 
Turkey. Another reason was the EP‘s opposition for blocking the EU‘s financial 
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aid.
262
 Thus, the intensification of the CU process reached an early challenge at its 
very beginning. 
From this point onwards, the expected new phase in the relations continued in 
a manner that only lead downhill. The year 1997 marked the first significant 
objection to the candidacy process. At the end of the Christian Democratic Party 
Summit of Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Italy and France, the Prime 
Minister of Belgium Wilfried Marten‘s stated that; ―Turkey had no place in the 
European Civilization Project‖ which placed the topic on the matter of cultural 
differences.
263
 In July, the Commission report on Agenda 2000 presented the new 
pre-accession strategy which included the Central and Eastern European countries 
as well as Cyprus. Turkey was excluded from the accession announcements 
constituting a huge letdown for the expectations based on the succession of the 
CU.
264
 The disappointments reached climax at the Luxembourg Summit on 
December 1997. While waiting for an announcement of the candidacy, Turkey 
saw the introduction of four political conditions. The Presidency Conclusions 
stated that further relations depended on: 
[1]the pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which 
[Turkey] has embarked, including the alignment of human rights 
standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; [2] 
respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of 
satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; [3] the 
settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the 
International Court of Justice; [4] and support for negotiations under 
the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of 
the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.
265
  
The reaction was very sharp as the singled out issues in the conclusions bared 
vital importance to Turkey‘s domestic and external policies. All political dialogue 
was unilaterally suspended and the subsequent partition in the 1998 European 
Conference was canceled.
266
 The suspension continued until the end of 1999 
Helsinki Summit‘s unanimous declaration of the Turkish candidacy.267 The same 
year also brought the significant development of the Kurdish Leader Abdullah 
Öcalan‘s capture in Kenya while leaving the Greek Embassy, which shook the 
political standing of the Greek government.
268
  
The declaration essentially implied two important outcomes. The pre-
conditions laid out in the Luxembourg Summit for the candidacy were dropped 
and Turkey would now benefit the aid that would come with the title. Following 
the worst duration the bilateral relations have ever seen, the CoA conducted its 
first meeting on April 2000 to start the screening process. The Accession 
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Partnership Document (APD) was signed by the end of the year together with the 
first Progress Report on Turkey.
269
 Adversely, on December, the Nice Summit 
took place projecting the future changes in the EU executive order with the 
enlargement of twenty-seven member states. Turkey was not included in the 
foreseen projection which created the first discontent after the announcement of 
the candidacy. Nonetheless, just before the Summit, the APD was adopted by the 
Council of Ministers containing the Framework Regulation for the financial 
aid.
270
 In essence, this passed the buck to Turkey for taking necessary steps and 
shortly after, on March 2001, ―The National Program of Turkey for Adopting the 
European Union‘s Acquis‖ was introduced, forecasting constitutional reform 
packages for enactment in the following years.
271
 
The years between 1996 and 2001 presents one of the most active periods 
within the timeline. Especially after the suspension of relations in 1997, the 
subsequent year, 1998, demonstrates the highest number of new engagements 
pursued within the extent of this study. In the three years of suspended dialogue, 
Turkey has successively initiated efforts for five different international 
organizations. As the candidacy was announced by the end of 1999 and the 
relations resumed, there is an observable decrease in the efforts within the 
following two years. Thus, with severe disappointments to the candidacy process 
and significant escalations in the efforts, this period presents one of the most 
concrete examples of the theoretical predictions. 
5.2.4 The ―golden age‖ 2002-2006   
The approval of the APD and the adoption of the National Program activated a 
period of mutual appreciation. The significant developments in the first half of 
this period are generally regarded as the ―golden age‖ of the relations.272 
Especially with the entrance of the JDP into the Turkish politics, the envisioned 
reforms were accelerated and extensive constitutional changes were underway.
273
  
By 2002, with the new National Program, considerable rights were granted to the 
Kurdish minorities and the death penalty was abolished in peace time.
274
 In 
addition, the new government declared unconditional support for the Annan Plan 
on the peaceful settlement of Cyprus. These developments were praised in the 
2002 Progress Report which also announced the first deadline for the initiation of 
the accession talks to be by 2005.
275 
The marking of the negotiation date was well 
received which led to the broadening of the introduced packages in alignment 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
269 Öniş 2003, p. 12 
270 Baykal & Arat 2010, p. 747 
271 Ibid, p. 747 
272 Kubicek 2013, p. 42;  Robins 2007, p. 293 
273 Kubicek 2013, p. 42 
274 Alpkaya 2010, p. 849 
275 Robins 2007, p. 292, Cengiz & Hoffmann 2013, p. 422 
  52 
with the EU Commission‘s second APD. In 2003, the death penalty was abolished 
all together.
276
  
By the end of 2004, the first Progress Report and an EP resolution declared the 
accession talks to be initiated for October 2005. However, the escalating good 
relations had steadily begun to stagnate by mid-2004. In essence, the most solitary 
reason was the aching problem of Cyprus. The Annan Plan was put on referendum 
on the island and the Turkish side had voted ―yes‖ as promised. Unfortunately, the 
plan was found unacceptable by the Greek side which voted against the 
settlement.
 
A month later, in May, the southern part of the island became a 
member of the EU.
277
 The Turkish reaction was an announcement on the 
extension of the EU agreements to the new member states which excluded 
Cyprus. The declaration was found inadmissible by the EU which pressured 
Turkey for the signing of the protocol for every new member state. At the end, 
Turkey did sign the additional protocol on July 2005 with a released communiqué 
stating the signature to not to imply recognition of the Republic of Cyprus.
278
 
Nevertheless, the screening for negotiations started at the set deadline and the first 
chapter was taken up in June 2006.
279
 Soon after the initiation, due to Turkey‘s 
exclusion of trade with Cyprus, eight chapters relevant to the internal market were 
decided to be frozen until unforeseeable notice by the European Council. Thus, 
the membership process and the accession negotiations bumped into a ―de facto 
halt.‖280 
As for the effects on the timeline of cooperative efforts, accounting a general 
affiliation of these developments necessitate a divided interpretation between the 
first and second half of this period. An additional reason for this motivation can 
be found in the difference amongst the Commission Progress Reports. While the 
period between 2001 and 2004 holds the most positive assessments, ―the 
following years, the Commission considered the progress in democratic reforms 
as well as the reforms concerning the Kurds as ‗limited‘ at best.‖281 To say the 
least, in contrast to the former period in the timeline, the 2002-2006 section 
presents a significantly lower amount of observable efforts. Especially during the 
first half, the timeline presents one of the most inactive years while marking a 
steady increase after 2004. Therefore, a positive conclusion can be made on this 
period of enhancing relations in the first-half together with the turn of events after 
2004, which are both congruent with the expected empirical development.  
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5.2.5 The frozen relationship 2007-2013 
After the reached stalemate within the accession negotiations, the following 
period between 2007 and 2011 could be labeled with very little progress 
bilaterally. In addition, by 2007, the opposition to Turkey‘s membership explicitly 
grew among the EU leaders. One example is the presidential election campaign 
that took place in France where one of the promises by Nicholas Sarkozy touched 
upon never admitting Turkey as a full member into the Union.
282
  
The criticisms were also enhanced in the Progress Reports starting from 2007; 
the mention of failure to continue the reform process became an annual 
discourse.
283
 By 2008, only thirteen out of thirty-five chapters were successfully 
opened for negotiation. The following year, 2009, brought about another obstacle 
for the candidacy as additional six more chapters were frozen on further talks by 
the Commission.
284
 The EP also adopted a resolution on Turkey demanding a 
presentation of satisfactory will for the continuation of the process.
285
 The little 
progress within the negotiations brought about opinions on whether an alternative 
option of a ―privileged partnership‖ should be considered, which met with sharp 
rejections by the Turkish side.
286
 
In 2010, Turkey took up a referendum to bring comprehensive reforms to its 
constitution which received positive reactions by the Commission.
287
 However, 
the relations were again strained after the EP adopted a resolution within the same 
year, sharply criticizing the lack of will the Turkish government was putting on 
the candidacy. The response by Erdoğan stated that the report was ―unbalanced‖ 
and ―written by people who did not know Turkey.‖288 By 2011, no new chapters 
received an initiation and the already opened chapters were still at minimum 
progress.
289
 Moreover, the same year also witnessed the first signal by Erdoğan 
for the suspension of political dialogue with the EU during the upcoming Cypriot 
presidency in July 2012.
290
 Lastly for this year, the new Progress Reports were 
issued with the by now usual tone of criticisms with a note of concern on the 
threat of freezing talks.
291
 As expected, the reaction came through Erdoğan‘s 
harsh statement claiming the reports to constantly ―sling mud‖ and showing 
―serious eclipse of reason at the EU.‖292 
In terms of any significant developments, the years 2012 and 2013 could be 
regarded not much different from the rest of this period. For the purposes of 
bringing fresh dynamism into the stagnant relations, in May 2012, the EU 
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launched the new ―positive agenda‖ for complementing the accession 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the freezing of political dialogue during the Cypriot 
Presidency could not be averted and the relations reached another pause until 
2013. The Progress Report of 2012 received even worse reactions as the opinion 
on the context was regarded to be ―bias‖ and ―unbalanced.‖293 After the 
Presidency passed, the relations resumed and an agreement on the opening of 
Chapter 22 was achieved.
294
  
On a final note, domestic turmoil had erupted in Turkey by mid-2013 over 
protests on the government decision to build a shopping mall in a public park in 
Istanbul. The handling of the protests with severe police crackdown led to 
discussions of postponing the initiation of the agreed chapter. The EP adopted a 
resolution on the incidents with ―deep concern‖ and several EU leaders gave voice 
for the delay. Not surprisingly, the warnings met sharp reactions where Erdoğan 
stated to ―not recognize decisions made by the EP‖295 and the EU should ―get 
lost‖ if such a decision was undertaken.296 
This last period with unquestionably stagnant relations and unforeseeable 
conclusions to the Turkish candidacy, coincides with the second most active 
period in the timeline. Especially after the first stalemate to the negotiations in 
2006, almost every subsequent year presents a new cooperative engagement. By 
some analysts this picture is also speculated for the specific efforts of this period. 
As pointed out by Kadri Gürsel; the successive applications to the SCO after 2006 
were not a coincidence but a mere result of the disappointments emerging from 
the accession negotiations.
297
 Thus, together with the 1996-2001 periods, this last 
section of the timeline presents the second most significant example of the 
theoretical arguments.  
5.2.6 The feasibility of the balance of influence predictions 
In sum then, it seems that every time there was a problem between Turkey and the 
EU, through the whole timespan covered here, Turkey decided to intensify its 
cooperation with other parts of the world. Especially, the follow up of the 
significant peaks within the intensity trends, demonstrate an observable 
congruence with the times of stagnant relations. Thus, we can now claim with 
confidence that the balance of influence propositions have a great deal of 
explanatory power. The analysis suggests that an explanation on Turkey‘s 
successive development of efforts for multilateral cooperation needs to consider 
the EU factor, whereby the bilateral disagreements toppled with possible threats to 
the candidacy, present a rather interesting consistency with the observable 
behavior.     
                                                                                                                                                   
 
293 Morelli 2013, p. 12 
294 Hurriyet Daily News 2013a 
295 Hurriyet Daily News 2013b  
296 Today‘s  Zaman 2013 
297 Gürsel 2013 
  55 
6 Conclusion 
This study was set out to explain the successive development of Turkey‘s 
multilateral cooperation efforts outside the EU since the membership pledge. The 
study focused into the sequences of events over the period of twenty-six years in 
the hope for achieving a congruent explanation. The contrast of findings 
according to the theoretical predictions eventually led to the materialization of the 
answer. Notwithstanding the uncertainties that are inherent in this kind of a study, 
a confident contributing claim can be made on the recurrent trend of the 
development of Turkey‘s efforts for collective cooperation. The observable 
foreign policy behavior has intensified during (or subsequent to) disagreements 
with the EU, especially in concern over the candidacy process. Another claim is 
possible on the extent of the Russia factor for Turkey‘s foreign policy within the 
timeframe here. As demonstrated, the assumption of a threatening Russia did not 
seem to provide an important significance on the empirical presentations. The 
empirical conclusions also give way for comments on the explanatory power of 
the highlighted theoretical predictions. The study identifies a crucial detail for the 
analysis of cooperation. That is, the apprehension of the aspect of effort within the 
concept of cooperation which may lead to different considerations. In addition, an 
initial deconstruction of the balance of power propositions brings out the 
possibility for interpreting the theoretical implications in three different paths. 
Relevantly, the balance of threat proposition was tested and found to be 
insufficient for the claim of congruity with Turkey‘s efforts. 
On the other hand, the balance of influence arguments helps to identify one 
negligence amongst the realist scholars: the possibility of a balancing behavior not 
against but rather in relation to an actor. The consideration of the EU as an enemy 
within Turkey‘s proximity will not adhere rational predictions. However, 
deliberation on the EU‘s impact capabilities by virtue of its status within Turkey‘s 
agenda, proposes effective results which can contribute the debates on the 
cooperative behavior of states. The paper also disentangles the arguments which 
try to depict the foreign policy behavior of Turkey. The initial perception of an 
inconsistent foreign policy behavior is now enlightened and demonstrated to be 
rather opposite. Furthermore, a comment can be made on the understanding of 
these efforts as mere bases for increasing the geostrategic importance of Turkey 
for the Western world. In that stance, the demonstrated linkages rather suggest 
this behavior to be as precautions taken in relation to the possible influence 
impacts deriving from these alliances. A final comment can be made on 
speculations which discuss whether the post-JDP Turkey is comparably more 
proned to move further away from the EU. As the paper presents, this argument is 
void considering the observance of the existent recurrent behavior through the 
pre-JDP periods. Thus, these conclusions give light to the many aforementioned 
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and untested predictions which underline such behavior on specific engagements 
on a wider systematic level. 
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